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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KATHLEEN GILES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970289-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (d) (1996) . See Judgment contained in Addendum A. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995) provides: 
(1) Each person who applies for public 
assistance shall disclose to the Department of 
Human Services each fact that may materially 
affect the determination of his eligibility to 
receive public assistance, including his current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind 
gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
(2) Any person applying for public 
assistance who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly fails to disclose any material fact 
required to be disclosed under Subsection (1) is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to the 
Department of Human Services any change in a 
material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1), within ten days after the date of 
the change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if 
that failure to disclose results in an 
overpayment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205 (1995) provides: 
Each of the following persons, who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly commits 
any of the following acts, is guilty of public 
assistance fraud: 
(1) any person who uses, transfers, 
acquires, traffics in, falsifies, or 
possesses any food stamp, food stamp 
identification card, certificate of 
eligibility for medical services, Medicaid 
identification card, or public assistance 
warrant in a manner not allowed by law; 
(2) any person who fraudulently 
misappropriates any funds exchanged for food 
stamps, any food stamp, food stamp 
identification card, certificate of 
eligibility for medical services, Medicaid 
identification card, or other public 
assistance with which he has been entrusted 
or that has come into his possession in 
connection with his duties in administering 
any state or federally funded public 
assistance program; 
(3) any person who receives an 
unauthorized payment as a result of acts 
described in this section; 
(4) any provider who receives payment 
or any recipient who receives benefits after 
failing to comply with any applicable 
requirement in Sections 76-8-1203 and 76-8-
1204; 
(5) any provider who files a claim for 
payment under any state or federally funded 
public assistance program for goods or 
services not provided to or for a recipient 
of that program; 
(6) any provider who files or 
falsifies a claim, report, or document 
required by state or federal law, rule, or 
provider agreement for goods or services not 
authorized under the state or federally 
funded public assistance program for which 
the goods or services were provided; 
(7) any provider who fails to credit 
the state for payments received from other 
sources; 
(8) any provider who bills a recipient 
or a recipient's family for goods or 
services not provided, or bills in an amount 
greater than allowed by law or rule; 
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(9) any recipient who, while receiving 
public assistance, acquires income or 
resources in excess of the amount he 
previously reported to the Department of 
Human Services, and fails to notify the 
department within ten days after acquiring 
the excess income or resources; 
(10) any person who fails to act as 
required under Section 76-8-1203 or 76-8-
1204 with intent to obtain or help another 
obtain an "overpayment" as defined in 
Section 62A-9-129; and 
(11) any person who obtains an 
overpayment by violation of Section 76-8-
1203 or 76-8-1204. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206 (Supp. 1997) provides: 
76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud 
(1) The severity of the offense of public 
assistance fraud is classified in accordance with 
the value of payments, assistance, or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or 
applied for as follows: 
(a) second degree felony if the value 
is or exceeds $5000; 
(b) third degree felony if the value 
exceeds $1000 but is less than $5000; 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value 
is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1000; 
and 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value 
is less than $300. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the 
value of an offense is calculated by aggregating 
the values of each instance of public assistance 
fraud committed by the defendant as part of the 
same facts and circumstances or a related series 
of facts and circumstances. 
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps 
that occur within a six-month period, committed 
by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to 
be a related series of facts and circumstances 
regardless of whether the transactions are 
conducted with a variety of unrelated parties. 
The text of the revised version of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1203 (Supp. 1997) is contained in Addendum B. The revised 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-12 03 (Supp. 1997) went into 
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effect on May 5, 1997, after the trial in this case. The 
penalties outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206 (Supp. 1997) 
went into effect May 1, 1995 and apply to this case. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in 
denying Appellant's motion to reduce Count II to a class B 
misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995) where 
that statute proscribes the same conduct as Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-8-1205 and 76-8-1206 but imposes the lesser class B 
misdemeanor sentence. 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions under a correction of the error standard. State v. 
Kent, 325 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing State 
v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
Preservation. Defendant/Appellant Kathleen Giles 
("Appellant" or "Giles") filed a "Motion to Reduce Offense 
Charged." (R. 29.) After the State rested, Appellant argued 
that pursuant to State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), she 
should be sentenced to a class B misdemeanor. (R. 155:70-78.) 
The trial judge denied the motion. (R. 155:8 9.) See Addendum C 
containing portions of record preserving this issue. 
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to 
establish the crime of public assistance fraud based on a failure 
to report a change in household composition and income where the 
State failed to establish that Felicetti shared meals with the 
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household, and otherwise failed to establish that overpayments 
exceeded $1000. 
Standard of Review. This Court will "reverse the jury's 
verdict in a criminal case when [it] conclude[s] as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction." 
Stately. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State 
v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). This Court 
reverses a conviction "only if the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant Committed the crime." 
Smith, 927 P. 2d at 651 (quoting inter atlia State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
Preservation. At the close of the State's case, 
Appellant made a number of motions regarding the efficacy of the 
State's case. (R. 155:70-95.) Although defense counsel did not 
separately move to dismiss Count II on these grounds, the trial 
judge considered this issue. 
The Court: In terms of Count Two, what is 
affected and where is the testimony as to what 
she received from that fraud? 
Prosecutor: Mr. Yei testified that from 
August 1st, '93 to February 28, '94 under the 
food stamp program, based upon unreported income, 
there was a fraud of $1,124 . . . . 
(R. 155:79.) While these statements we.re made in the midst of 
argument as to whether the two counts should have been aggregated 
into ci single count, they nevertheless indicate that the argument 
prompted the judge to consider whether sufficient evidence 
existed to convict Giles of Count II. See Addendum C containing 
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portions of record relevant to this issue. 
Additionally, this issue should be reviewed for manifest 
injustice and plain error. "Manifest injustice" occurs where 
"exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" exist. See State v. 
Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam); State v. Irwin, 
924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In Haston, the Supreme Court 
determined that exceptional circumstances exist where an 
individual may have been incarcerated for something which is not 
a crime. Haston, 846 P.2d at 1277. Likewise, exceptional 
circumstances exist where an individual is convicted of a crime 
despite the State's failure to introduce sufficient evidence to 
establish that the person committed the crime. See id.; see also 
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8-9. 
Moreover, this error should have been obvious to the 
trial judge, who, at one point, questioned the sufficiency of the 
evidence under Count II (R. 155:79) and who is charged pursuant 
to rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, with arresting 
judgment pursuant to the court's own motion where the State fails 
to present sufficient evidence to support a charge. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 23. The error is prejudicial since Giles was convicted 
on Count II where the State failed to prove she committed the 
crime. Accordingly, in the event this Court determines that the 
issue was not adequately preserved, it nevertheless should be 
reviewed based on the plain error and exceptional circumstances 
doctrines. 
3. Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to 
6 
consolidate Counts I and II where the counts contained identical 
allegations based on the same or related facts and circumstances. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Patience, 323 
Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Preservation. This issue is preserved at R. 155:67-70. 
The trial judge denied Appellant's motion to consolidate the two 
counts. (R. 155:89; see Addendum C.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information dated July 26, 1996, the State charged 
Defendant/Appellant Kathleen Giles with two counts of welfare 
fraud. (R. 01-5; see Addendum D containing the Information.) In 
Count I, the State alleged "a second degree felony, in violation 
of § 76-8-1201 et. seq., (formerly § 62A-9-130), Utah Code Ann. 
which occurred on, around, or between July 1, 1993 and July 31, 
1995" and that Giles fraudulently obtained benefits which 
"exceeded $5,000." (R. 01-2.) In Count II, using identical 
language and changing only the dates and amounts fraudulently 
obtained, the State alleged that "in violation of § 76-8-1201 
et. seq." Giles committed a third degree felony of welfare fraud 
"on, around or between August 1, 1993 and February 28, 1994" and 
obtained benefits which exceeded $1,000. (R. 02; see 
Addendum D.) 
Prior to trial, Giles filed a "Motion to Reduce Offense 
Charged" pursuant to Shondel, 453 P.2d 146. (R. 29.) 
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On February 18 and 19, 1997, a jury trial was held before 
the Honorable David S. Young. At the close of the State's case, 
Giles moved (1) to reduce the crimes to class B misdemeanors, 
(2) to aggregate the two counts into a single second degree 
felony, and (3) to dismiss Count I since the State had failed to 
establish that Giles had lawfully married Paul Felicetti and 
therefore had failed to establish that Giles had withheld 
material information regarding her marriage. 
During the hearing on Giles' motions, the prosecutor 
indicated that Count I was based on failure to report a marriage 
and the resultant overpayments whereas the other count was based 
on failure to report a change in household composition and income 
and the resulting overpayments. (R. 155:82.) The trial judge 
denied the first motions. (R. 155:89.) He took the motion to 
dismiss based on the State's failure to prove a lawful marriage 
under advisement pending the jury decision. (R. 155:86-7.) 
The court instructed the jury as requested by the State 
(R. 155:79-81) regarding the elements of the two counts. (R. 98, 
99.) See Addendum E containing Instructions 5 and 6. Both 
counsel stated on the record that they had no exceptions to the 
instructions. (R. 154-55.) 
After the extensive discussions as to whether the case 
should go to the jury on Count I, defense counsel indicated that 
the matter should go to the jury since otherwise the State might 
appeal the judge's ruling. (R. 155:127.) However, defense 
counsel reserved his ability to later address the issue by filing 
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a motion to arrest judgment. (R. 155:127.) 
The jury convicted Giles on both counts. (R. 107, 110.) 
On February 21, 1997, Giles filed a motion to arrest 
judgment on Count I. (R. 115-119.) The trial judge granted that 
motion as to Count I on March 31, 1997 and entered a written 
order arresting judgment on April 30, 1997. (R. 126, 143.) On 
March 31, 1997, the trial judge entered judgment, sentencing 
Giles on Count II, a third degree felony. (R. 127.) 
Giles filed a Notice of Appeal on April 30, 1997. 
(R. 133.) On May 28, 1997, the State filed a Notice of Cross-
Appeal. (R. 145.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State presented the following evidence in support of 
the two counts of public assistance fraud. 
Julie Cook was the manager of the apartment building in 
which Kathleen Giles lived from February 1993 to July 1995. 
(R. 154:65.) Ms. Cook testified that Giles lived with Paul 
Felicetti. (R. 154:66.) She described it as a "more constant" 
type of relationship which appeared to be a family. (R. 154:66-
67.) At one point, Giles admired Ms. Cook's wedding dress and 
talked about getting married. (R. 154:74.) 
The State introduced as exhibits leases for the apartment 
at 727 Red Maple Rd. One lease is dated July 1, 1992 and lists 
the tenants as "Paul and Kathy Felicetti" and is signed only by 
Kathleen Giles. (R. 154:69.) Another is dated August 1, 1993, 
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lists "Paul" as the party renting the premises and is signed by 
Paul Felicetti. (R. 154:71.) This document lists the following 
persons as authorized occupants: Robert Giles, Paul Giles, 
Ashton Giles, Kathy Felicetti, and Paul Felicetti. Exhibit S-2 
also indicates that rent will be increased if any person stays 
for a two-week period. According to Ms. Cook, the lease was 
binding for the entire period regardless of whether the household 
composition changed. (R. 154:73.) The third lease is dated 
August 1, 1994. (R. 154:71.) "Paul and Kathy Felicetti" are 
listed as lessees; the document is signed by Paul Felicetti and 
Kathy Giles. (R. 154:72.) Paul usually paid the rent in cash. 
(R. 154:81.) Ms. Cook had no idea where the money came from. 
(R. 154:81.) In July 1995, Giles moved out of the apartment. 
(R. 154:75.) 
A Mormon bishop testified that in mid-summer 1993, he 
performed a marriage ceremony for Giles. (R. 154:89, 90.) 
Following the ceremony, the bishop made sure that the marriage 
license form was filled out and signed by the witnesses and 
himself. (R. 154:93.) He then asked the participants to mail in 
the form. (R. 154:93.) The form was never returned, and the 
requirement that the form be filed within 30 days was not met. 
(R. 154:93, D-5.) 
The State presented testimony from two eligibility 
workers at the Office of Family Support. Kathy Cordova was the 
eligibility worker for Giles beginning the end of August 1993 and 
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running through April 1994. (R. 154:102, 122.)1 
Cordova was responsible for determining initial 
eligibility, continued eligibility, case maintenance, reviews, 
and updating any reported changes. (R. 154:102.) She testified 
that after an individual has filled out an application for 
assistance, she conducts a face-to-face interview in an attempt 
to ensure that the information in the application is correct. 
(R. 154:106.) 
Giles filled out two documents for the office while 
Cordova was her caseworker. (S-6 and S-7, R. 154:122.) The only 
two contacts Cordova could remember having with Giles occurred 
when Giles filled out those two documents. (R. 154:122.) 
The State introduced Giles' application for financial or 
medical assistance or food stamps, dated August 30, 1993 and 
marked S-6. (R. 154:103, 104.) Cordova conducted an interview 
with Giles on September 1, 1993, during which Cordova went over 
the application and wrote in changes with a blue felt tip pen. 
(R. 154:106, 126.) Paul Felicetti is not mentioned in that 
document. (R. 154:107-08.) Giles marked her marital status as 
single. (R. 154:113.) Cordova testified that Giles never 
1
 Cordova could not recall whether she was Giles' caseworker 
prior to that time and did not know who Giles' caseworker was prior 
to Cordova. (R. 154:107.) Cordova also did not know what Giles 
had told the previous caseworker and could only testify that Giles 
had not told Cordova about Felicetti during either of the two 
interviews they had between August 1993 and April 1994. 
(R. 154:123.) Cordova also did not know whether Felicetti was 
living at the apartment between August 1993 and April 1994. 
(R. 154:123.) 
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mentioned marriage plans, "William" Felicetti or "William"2 
Felicetti's employment to her. (R. 154:118.) However, Cordova 
did receive either a copy of the lease or a landlord statement 
completed by the lessor. (R. 154:134-35.) She did not think she 
knew who Paul Felicetti was. (R. 154:3 5.) She could not answer 
whether her office knew who he was. (R. 154:13 5.) 
According to Cordova, recipients are required to report 
marriages and changes in household arrangements. (R. 154:107.) 
Exhibit S-6 lists three children living in the household, one of 
which had the last name of Felicetti. (R. 154:108.) Cordova 
testified that if the father of a child is living in a household, 
the child would not be eligible for financial assistance. 
(R. 154:109.) Immediately following this testimony, Cordova 
equivocated, stating that the child in common "may not have been 
eligible had the father been reported." (R. 154:109 (emphasis 
added).) Later, she stated generally that if the father of a 
child were living in the household, regardless of whether he was 
married to the mother, the benefits of the child in common would 
be affected, and that the recipient would receive more benefits 
than that to which she would be entitled. (R. 154:112.) She 
also testified that the income of a boyfriend living in the 
household would be counted in determining assistance for a child 
in common. (R. 154:117.) A spouse's income would also be 
counted in determining assistance. (R. 154:117.) Cordova also 
2
 Paul William Felicetti is Giles' former boyfriend and the 
individual who the State claimed was married to Giles and living 
with her when she received assistance. See Defense Exhibit 4. 
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testified that if a boyfriend who was the father of a child lived 
in the home, "that child would not have been eligible for 
financial assistance, so the grant would have been reduced." 
(R. 154:128.) 
When asked by how much the grant would have been reduced 
based on the father of one of the children living in the home, 
Cordova responded that she was not sure but she thought the grant 
would change by forty dollars to fifty dollars per month. 
(R. 154:129.) Additionally, the child would not receive medical 
benefits, and food stamps would have changed, according to 
Cordova. (R. 154:129.) Cordova did not know how much food 
stamps would have changed and did not state the amount of medical 
benefits which the Felicetti child had received during the period 
of August 1993 through February 1994.3 
On redirect, Cordova testified that if a boyfriend is in 
the home, many considerations such as employment and assets need 
to be taken into account. (R. 154:137.) Whether the boyfriend 
is the father of any of the children also is a factor which must 
be taken into account. (R. 154:137.) While Cordova testified 
that those factors are variable and could affect the 
determination as to benefits, she did not specify the effect in 
this case. In other words, she did not testify specifically as 
to the excess amount Giles received per month. (R. 154:13 7.) 
3
 Cordova also stated at one point, "if he's providing any 
income to the house it wouldn't matter if he had a child in common 
with the applicant." (R. 154:13 0.) Cordova never elaborated on 
this statement. 
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According to Cordova, persons who live in a household but 
who do not share food do not affect food stamp eligibility and 
need not be reported. (R. 154:125). On both S-6 and S-7, Giles 
checked "no" in response to the questions, "Do you share food 
with everyone in your home?"4 and "Do you eat with everyone in 
your home?" 
Exhibit S-6 indicates no income. It shows that Giles 
left her job at Rascals in June 1993. 
Exhibit S-7 is a review form dated January 1, 1994. 
A review form is done to "try to reevaluate or redetermine 
eligibility at least every six months." (R. 154:115.) That 
document also indicates that Giles had no income. (R. 154:116-
17.) It shows the three children and Giles as the only household 
members. (R. 154:117.) 
The defense introduced a judgment showing that Paul 
Felicetti was in arrears in payment of child support during the 
periods involved in this case. See D-8. Exhibit D-8 shows that 
Felicetti did not support Ashton Felicetti during the applicable 
period. (R. 154:132-33.) 
Debbie Campbell testified that she became Giles' 
caseworker in April 1995, following Cordova. (R. 154:140.)5 
The State introduced an Application for Assistance, S-9, dated 
4
 In S-6, Cordova changed the answer to "yes." See 
R. 154:106, 126. Giles did not list the name(s) of persons who do 
not share food in either document. 
5
 Kathy Cordova testified that she stopped being Giles' 
caseworker in April 1994. 
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May 20, 1994.6 In S-9, Giles listed Paul Felicetti as a 
boyfriend living in the household. (R. 154:14 6.) Exhibit S-9 
also indicates Felicetti's place of employment and number of 
hours worked and estimated the household income at $900 per 
month. According to Campbell, if the person living in the 
household is a boyfriend, the recipient loses benefits for 
children in common. (R. 154:146-47.) If the person is a spouse, 
"you are not eligible for benefits under the deprivation policy, 
because there's no deprivation." (R. 154:146.) Campbell also 
testified that "the addition of Mr. Felicetti" would affect the 
other children only if he and Giles were married. (R. 154:149.) 
Campbell also gave the following testimony regarding the effect 
of Felicetti on Giles' benefits: 
PROSECUTOR: Give us a thumbnail sketch of 
the extent it could affect medical or other 
programs? 
CAMPBELL: If they are married, they don't 
have medical program for a two-parent household. 
They did come out with one that was called 
F.M.T.P, which means family medical for two 
parents. 
But I don't know the effect at this time 
when the stipulation to that -- there is also the 
deprivation issue, which means unemployment. So 
usually unless a person is unemployed, they don't 
have enough income to be -- they have more income 
than they should to be eligible for that program. 
(R. 154:150.) She also stated that Giles could have received 
assistance for herself and two children, but not for the child 
6
 Exhibit S-20 shows that Giles did not receive payments 
between January 31, 1994 and May 20, 1994. The reason for this 
lapse was not explained. On May 20, 1994, she made a new 
application for assistance; Campbell was her caseworker. 
(R. 154:142, 144.) 
15 
she had with Felicetti if Felicetti, the boyfriend, were living 
in the house. (R. 154:155.) 
Exhibit S-10, executed in July 1994, also lists Paul 
Felicetti as a boyfriend; see also S-ll, S-12, S-13, review 
documents dated respectively October 31, 1994; January 30, 1995; 
May 1, 1995. Giles did not tell Campbell she was married. 
(R. 154:161.) Campbell did not recall being informed that 
Felicetti moved out of the house. (R. 154:180.) Exhibits D-14 
and D-15 establish that she was informed. 
Campbell testified further that the only thing she 
thought Giles did wrong was report Felicetti as a boyfriend 
rather than a husband. (R. 154:187.) She elaborated that if 
Paul were a boyfriend, Giles would still get benefits for herself 
and her two children. (R. 154:191.) When asked, "If he's a 
husband, she doesn't get any benefits?," Campbell responded, "No, 
not necessary. If there is deprivation." (R. 154:191.) She 
stated that if Felicetti were a boyfriend, Giles got more than if 
he were a husband. 
Based on 1985 figures, Campbell guessed that Giles would 
have gotten $426 if Felicetti were a boyfriend, and nothing if he 
were a spouse. (R. 154:192.) 
Campbell also testified that if someone else moves into a 
house, additional benefits such as food stamps could be obtained 
unless that person was married. (R. 154:203, 205, 207.) Even if 
the person were working, she could still get more benefits. 
(R. 154:206. ) 
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The State learned about the possibility that Giles might 
have been married when Giles reported that she had requested a 
marriage license but did not think the marriage was official. 
(D-14, R. 154:185-86.) 
The State also presented testimony from Albert Yei, an 
auditor with the Office of Recovery Services. (R. 155:4.) Yei 
was not a caseworker for Giles and had not met with Giles. 
(R. 155:45.) The State presented Yei as a "fact" witness rather 
than an "expert" witness to make calculations as to what Giles 
was entitled to receive as opposed to what she actually received. 
(R. 155:13, 18.) 
Over defense counsel's foundational objection, Yei 
testified that the family was not entitled to any AFDC payments 
from July 1993 through July 1995. (R. 155:32, 33.) This 
testimony was based on a belief that Giles and Felicetti were 
married. (R. 155:48-50, 53.) Giles received $9,160 from AFDC 
during that period. (R. 155:34.) 
Yei also testified that Giles received overpayment on 
food stamps during the period of August 1993 through February 
1994. (R. 155:35.) That determination was based on Paul 
Felicetti's income during that period and on the assumption that 
he was a member of the household and ate his meals with them. 
(R. 155:55.) Giles would be entitled to the food stamps if 
Felicetti were not living there. (R. 155:37.) According to Yei, 
the overpayment amount was $1,424. (R. 155:3 8.) 
Additionally, Yei testified that based on his assumption 
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that Giles was married, Giles received an overpayment in premiums 
for medical benefits. (R. 155:41, 56.) According to Yei, the 
overpayment totaled $1,774.80. Yei testified that if Giles were 
not married, "she may be entitled to those [medical benefits]." 
(R. 155:56.) 
Yei acknowledged that if Giles was not married, his 
calculations may be inaccurate. (R. 155:48.) He agreed that a 
portion of his figures could be in error if Giles were not 
married, but could not establish which portion was in error. 
(R. 155:49.) When asked what the AFDC overpayment would be if 
Giles were not married, Yei could not respond; instead, he 
testified that he "would have to re-review the information to 
determine whether or not there existed an overpayment." 
(R. 155:50.) Later, he stated that if she is not married, the 
question of whether she was entitled to AFDC would need to be 
answered. (R. 155:53.) 
Finally, the defense presented testimony from an attorney 
who testified that Giles approached him around July 19 95 "for the 
purpose of getting custody of her children." (R. 155:98.) When 
Giles approached him, she expressed "confusion about whether her 
marriage was valid." (R. 155:101.) He apparently filed for 
divorce to make sure that the legal concerns relevant to the 
relationship, such as custody, were properly resolved. 
(R. 155:101.) The lawyer did not know whether the marriage was 
valid, and typically does not ask for a copy of the marriage 
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license. (R. 155:106.) He did not look at the marriage license 
in this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Shondel Argument. The trial judge committed 
reversible error in refusing to allow Giles the benefit of the 
lesser class B misdemeanor penalty set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1203. Both section 76-8-1203 and section 76-8-1205 
contain the same elements--failure to disclose material 
information listed in section 76-8-1203 which results in an 
overpayment. Pursuant to section 76-8-1203, the penalty is a 
class B misdemeanor regardless of the value of the overpayment. 
Pursuant to section 76-8-1206, the penalty is a third degree 
felony where the value of the overpayment exceeds $1000 but is 
less than $5000. State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, and its progeny 
mandate that Giles be given the benefit of the lesser penalty. 
Point II. Insufficient Evidence. The marshalled 
evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Giles 
committed the third degree felony crime of public assistance 
fraud. The State presented evidence regarding claimed 
overpayments in three areas: AFDC, food stamps and medical 
premium payments. This evidence failed to establish, however, 
that the failure to disclose household composition and income 
resulted in overpayments in excess of $1000. 
Albert Yei, the auditor who testified as to the amount of 
overpayment, based his overpayment figures for medical premiums 
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and AFDC on the assumption that Felicetti and Giles were married. 
Yei's testimony did nothing to establish overpayments for medical 
premiums or AFDC based on a failure to report household 
composition and income. 
Eligibility worker Cordova guessed that Giles received 
grant overpayments of $40 to $50 per month. This would total 
only $280 to $350 for the seven-month period alleged in Count II. 
Although Cordova thought Giles had received overpayment on 
medical premiums, Cordova did not suggest the value of 
overpayment for medical premiums. Eligibility worker Campbell 
acknowledged that a different type of medical premium may well 
have been available to Giles even if Felicetti lived in the 
household. The testimony from the two eligibility workers 
therefore failed to establish an overpayment or the amount 
thereof in the medical premiums and established at best a total 
grant overpayment of less than $400. 
Yei's testimony that Giles received $1424 overpayment for 
food stamps was based on an assumption that Felicetti shared 
meals with the household. No evidence was presented to this 
effect. In fact, Giles checked "no" on the two relevant forms 
when asked whether everyone in the household shared meals. The 
eligibility workers testified that food stamps would not be 
reduced unless meals were shared. Campbell testified that food 
stamps might increase if a new person moved into the household. 
Much of the State's case focused on Count I, the claimed 
overpayments based on the allegation that Giles failed to inform 
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the Department she was married. In regard to any overpayments 
which resulted from a failure to inform the Department of 
household composition and income, the State failed to establish 
that such nondisclosure resulted in overpayments in excess of 
$1000. 
Point III. Consolidation. The two counts of public 
assistance fraud involved a single continuous transaction based 
on one general intent and plan. The evidence introduced by the 
State in support of the two counts was based on Ma related series 
of facts and circumstances." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1206(2), the trial judge erred in refusing to consolidate the two 
counts. This error did not prejudice Giles unless the State is 
successful in reinstating Count I through its cross-appeal in 
this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY WHERE UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-8-1203 (1995) CONTAINS THE SAME ELEMENTS AND 
IMPOSES A LESSER CLASS B MISDEMEANOR PENALTY. 
The well established rule is that a statute 
creating a crime should be sufficiently certain 
that persons of ordinary intelligence who desire 
to obey the law may know how to conduct 
themselves in conformity with it. [footnote 
omitted] A fair and logical concomitant of that 
rule is that such a penal statute should be 
similarly clear, specific and understandable as 
to the penalty imposed for its violation. 
Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148; see also Vogt, 824 P.2d at 457. 
In State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986), the 
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Supreme Court indicated, n[t]he analytical framework" for 
evaluating "Shondel" claims: 
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there 
are significant differences between offenses and 
so that the exact same conduct is not subject to 
different penalties depending on which of two 
statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to 
charge. To allow that would be to allow a form 
of arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of 
law. 
Id. (quoting State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985)) . 
Where "two statutes proscribe the same behavior, but 
impose different penalties, the defendant is entitled to the 
lesser penalty." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (citing Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148); State v. Loveless, 
581 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1978). The test for determining whether 
two statutes proscribe identical conduct is whether the two 
statutes contain the same elements. Gomez, 722 P.2d at 74 9; see 
also Kent, 325 Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. 
Failure to sentence a defendant to the lesser punishment 
where two statutes proscribe the same conduct violates state and 
federal due process and equal protection. See Kent, 325 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 9; Bryan, 709 P.2d at 261 (quoting State v. 
Twitchell, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1959)); Shondel, 453 P.2d at 
148; Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
In Count II, the State charged Giles with public 
assistance fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1201 et. seq. (R. 02.) This charge is based on 
a claim that Giles failed to disclose a material fact, the 
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composition and income of her household. (R. 04-05; 155:77-79, 
81-2.) The elements instruction for Count II required the jury-
to find Giles failed to disclose to the Department of Human 
Services $. fact which would materially affect eligibility, "to 
wit, household composition and income." (R. 99.) 
Subsection (11) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205 (1995) 
proscribes the conduct alleged in this case; Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1203 (1995) contains the same elements and proscribes identical 
conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205(11) states: 
Each of the following persons, who 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly commits 
any of the following acts, is guilty of public 
assistance fraud: 
(11) any person who obtains an 
overpayment by violation of Section 
76-8-1203 or 76-8-1204. 
(emphasis added). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206, 
violation of these subsections is a class B misdemeanor if the 
value of the payments received is less than $300; a class A 
misdemeanor if the value "exceeds $300 but is less than $1000"; a 
"third degree felony if the value exceeds $1000 but is less than 
$5000"; and a "second degree felony if the value is or exceeds 
$5000." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206 (Supp. 1997), 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995) proscribes the 
identical conduct as subsection (11) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1205. It states: 
(1) Each person who applies for public 
assistance shall disclose to the Department of 
Human Services each fact that may materially 
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affect the determination of his eligibility to 
receive public assistance, including his current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind 
gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
(2) Any person applying for public 
assistance who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly fails to disclose any material fact 
required to be disclosed under Subsection (1) is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to the 
Department of Human Services any change in a 
material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1), within ten days after the date of 
the change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if 
that failure to disclose results in an 
overpayment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995) (emphasis added). 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) 
(1995) makes it a class B misdemeanor for a recipient to 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly fail to disclose a 
material fact outlined in subsection (1) "if that failure to 
disclose results in an overpayment"7 (emphasis added). That 
section contains elements which are identical to those in 
subsection (11) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205. Indeed, the plain 
language of those subsections make it a crime to violate Utah 
7
 The language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (Supp. 1997) was 
amended effective May 5, 1997, following trial and sentencing in 
this case; see Addendum B containing revised version of statute. 
That amended statute deletes the element requiring that the failure 
to disclose result in an overpayment. Under the revised section 
76-8-1203 (Supp. 1997), a recipient is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor by simply failing to disclose the material fact. The 
current version of the statute does not, however, apply in this 
case which was tried prior to the amendment. 
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Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 and receive "benefits" or an "overpayment." 
No distinction exists between sections 76-8-1203 and 76-8-1205 
since both sections prohibit a failure to disclose material 
information which results in an overpayment. 
The only basis for treating a violation of section 
76-8-1203 which results in an overpayment as a felony rather than 
the class B misdemeanor outlined in section 76-8-1203 is found in 
the penalty provision of section 76-8-1206. That provision, 
"Penalties for public assistance fraud," outlines different 
penalties for public assistance fraud defined in section 
76-8-1205 based on the value of the overpayment. Hence, section 
76-8-1203 (1995) makes the penalty for failure to disclose 
material information which results in overpayment a class B 
misdemeanor regardless of the amount of overpayment whereas 
section 76-8-1205 assigns a harsher punishment for the identical 
crime based on the amount of overpayment. 
In this case, "the exact same conduct is [] subject to 
different penalties depending on which of two statutory sections 
a prosecutor chooses to charge." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. 
Accordingly, Giles is entitled to the lesser class B misdemeanor 
penalty. See Duran, 772 P.2d at 987; Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148. 
POINT II. THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE ALLEGED FAILURE TO 
REPORT HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND INCOME, WHICH 
RESULTED IN AN OVERPAYMENT IN EXCESS OF $1000. 
In Count II, the State claimed that Giles failed to 
disclose material information regarding household composition and 
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income, which resulted in an overpayment in excess of $1000. 
(R. 2, Addendum D; R. 99, Addendum E; R. 155:82.)8 It is not 
clear whether the State based its claim in Count II on alleged 
overpayments in all three areas: AFDC, food stamps and payments 
of medical premiums, or in just the food stamp area. See 
R. 155:81-82.9 A review of the marshalled evidence 
demonstrates, however, that the State failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the alleged failure to report household 
composition and income resulted in overpayment in excess of 
$1000. 
Albert Yei's testimony did not establish overpayments in 
AFDC or medical premiums based on a failure to disclose household 
composition and income. Yei based his calculations as to 
overpayments for AFDC and medical premiums on the assumption 
Felicetti and Giles were married. (R. 155:41, 49-50, 53, 56.) 
Regarding the medical premiums, Yei acknowledged that his 
overpayment calculation was based on the assumption they were 
married (R. 155:41, 56) and that if Giles and Felicetti were not 
married, Giles "may be entitled to those [medical benefits]." 
(R. 155:56.) Regarding AFDC overpayments, Yei acknowledged that 
his figures may be inaccurate if the two were not married, could 
not testify to an overpayment figure if the two were not married, 
8
 Count I was based on a failure to report a marriage and the 
resulting overpayments. (R. 155:82.) 
9
 The prosecutor indicated that Count II based on failure to 
report a change in household income and composition was supported 
by Yei's testimony that between August and February, Giles received 
an overpayment in food stamps of $1400. (R. 155:81-82.) 
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and testified that if Giles were not married, the question of 
whether she was entitled to AFDC would need to be answered. 
(R. 155:53.) Although Yei testified that Giles received 
overpayments in excess of $1000 for medical premiums and AFDC 
based on his assumption Giles and Felicetti were married, the 
marshalled evidence demonstrates that Yei's testimony failed to 
establish that either the AFDC or medical premium overpayment 
resulted from a failure to disclose household income or 
composition. 
Likewise, the testimony of eligibility worker Campbell 
did not establish that Giles received an overpayment in excess of 
$1000 in AFDC and/or medical premiums based on a failure to 
disclose information regarding household composition or income. 
Campbell testified that if a boyfriend lives in the house, the 
recipient loses benefits for children in common. (R. 154:146-
47.) She also testified that the only thing Giles did wrong was 
to not report a marriage to Felicetti. (R. 154:187.) Campbell 
guessed that if Felicetti were a boyfriend, Giles would have 
gotten $426 per month whereas if he were a husband, Giles would 
have received nothing. (R. 154:192.) In regard to medical 
benefits, Campbell testified that a medical program for two-
parent families was available (R. 154:150) and did not offer 
testimony as to the effect on medical payments if Giles had 
provided information that Felicetti lived in the house. Hence, 
Campbell's testimony failed to establish that Giles received over 
$1000 in overpayment based on a failure to report household 
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income and composition. 
Cordova testified that if the father of a child were 
living in the house, that child would not be entitled to 
assistance. (R. 154:128.) She was not sure how the grant would 
change if the father of one of the children were living in the 
house, but guessed that it would be reduced by $40 to $50 per 
month. (R. 154:129.) Assuming, arguendo, that Cordova's 
testimony were sufficient to show a reduction in AFDC, the total 
amount of reduction for the seven-month period alleged in the 
Information would be $280 to $350, far short of the "in excess of 
$1000" which was required to meet the charge. Additionally, 
while Cordova testified that the medical benefits would change if 
the father of one of the children were living in the household, 
she did not know how much they would change. (R. 154:129.) 
Hence, the combined testimony of Yei, Campbell and 
Cordova fails to establish the amount of change if any, in the 
medical benefits if the Department had been informed that 
Felicetti, the apparent father of one of the children, lived in 
the house. Additionally, the combined testimony of Yei, Campbell 
and Cordova demonstrated at best that Giles received an AFDC 
overpayment of $280 to $350. 
The only remaining area of alleged overpayment was in 
food stamps. As was the case with the testimony regarding 
medical benefits and AFDC grants, this testimony was confusing 
and at times contradictory. Yei testified that Giles received a 
food stamp overpayment during the period of August 1993 through 
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February 28, 1994 of $1424. (R. 155:35, 38.) Yei did not work 
directly on Giles' case and based his calculations on certain 
assumptions which were supplied to him. His $1424 overpayment 
figure was based on the assumption that Felicetti was a member of 
the household and ate his meals there. (R. 155:55.) Cordova 
testified that food stamps would have changed due to the income, 
but did not know by how much. (R. 154:129.) She also testified, 
however, that persons who live in the home but who do not share 
food do not affect food stamp eligibility. (R. 154:125.) 
Campbell testified that food stamp benefits might actually 
increase if someone else moved into the home. (R. 154:203, 205, 
206, 207.) 
The State failed to introduce evidence to establish that 
even if Felicetti lived in the home, he shared meals with the 
other household members. Indeed, when Giles filled out S-6 and 
S-7, she checked "no" next to the questions pertaining to whether 
everyone in the household shared food. Exhibit S-6 was filled 
out September 1, 1993. Caseworker Cordova changed the answer to 
the question regarding whether everyone ate together, but did not 
testify as to any details regarding that change. Exhibit S-7 was 
filled out January 25, 1994. It contains a "no" response 
regarding whether everyone in the household shared food. 
While the testimony of the landlord, the lease agreements 
and Felicetti's license, when considered in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, arguably indicate that Felicetti lived 
in the Red Maple apartment, there is no evidence that he ate 
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meals with the household members. Indeed, S-6 and S-7 indicate 
otherwise .10 
Hence, while the State arguably established overpayments 
of AFDC in the amount of $280 to $350, this amount is less than 
the "in excess of $1000" which is required for a third degree 
felony. Additionally, the confusing and contradictory testimony 
failed to establish that Giles received overpayments in medical 
premiums in excess of $1000. Finally, the State failed to 
establish that even if Felicetti were part of the household, he 
shared food with the household; accordingly, it failed to 
establish that the food stamp benefit would have decreased if the 
Department were informed that Felicetti lived in the house. The 
marshalled evidence in this case failed to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Giles received overpayments in excess of 
$10 0 0 based on a failure to report household income and 
composition. Judgment for Count II should be reversed and the 
count dismissed. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT1S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE TWO COUNTS. 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206(2), Giles moved to 
10
 Exhibit S-18 shows that Giles did not receive any food 
stamps for March and April 1994, the two months following the dates 
charged in Count II. The State offered no explanation for the 
cessation of benefits. Thereafter, on May 20, 1994, Giles filled 
out State's exhibit 9 in which she listed Paul Felicetti as a 
member of the household and indicated that all meals were shared. 
The same information is contained in S-10 which was filled out on 
July 27, 1994. Exhibits S-9, S-10 and S-18 suggest that a change 
in living arrangements, including a sharing of food, occurred at 
the end of February 1994. 
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consolidate the two counts into a single charge. (R. 155:67-70.) 
The trial judge denied the motion. (R. 155:89.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206(2) (1995) states: 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) , the 
value of an offense is calculated by aggregating 
the value of each instance of pubic assistance 
fraud committed by the defendant as part of the 
same facts and circumstances or a related series 
of facts and circumstances. 
(emphasis added). 
In State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court articulated the test for determining whether a 
single offense or separate offenses occurred. 
. . . [T]he general test as to whether there are 
separate offenses or one offense is whether the 
evidence discloses one general intent or 
discloses separate and distinct intents. The 
particular facts and circumstances of each case 
determine this question. If there is but one 
intention, one general impulse, and one plan, 
even though there is a series of transactions, 
there is but one offense . . . . 
Id. at 518 (quoting People v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1950) ) . 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in State 
v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996). In Crosby, the State 
charged three counts of theft, alleging that "between November of 
1991 and June of 1992, Crosby misappropriated company funds for 
her personal use." Id. at 36. Crosby argued on appeal that 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel occurred where 
she was convicted of three counts of theft rather than one count. 
Id. at 40. The Court pointed out that " [t]he evidence in this 
case demonstrates that although the transactions underlying 
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Crosby's theft convictions occurred over a period of time, they 
were part of a single plan and should have been charged as a 
single offense." Id. Although the various transactions in 
Crosby "were separated into different counts to distinguish the 
different methods Crosby used to allegedly avert cash for her 
personal use," the jury instructions "made no distinction between 
the three counts." Relying on Kimbel and State v. Patterson, 700 
P.2d 1104 (Utah 1985), and the facts of the case, the Court held 
that plain error occurred in sentencing Crosby to more than one 
count of second degree felony theft. 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995) provides: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any 
such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
This statute supports the holding in Crosby. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 
645. 
In this case, the State charged two counts of public 
assistance fraud. (R. 01-02; see Information in Addendum D.) 
The two counts contained identical allegations except as to the 
precise time frame and the value of the overpayments or benefits. 
(R. 01-02.) Count I was alleged to have occurred between July 1, 
1993 and July 31, 1995. (R. 01.) Count II was alleged to have 
occurred in a shorter period of time which fell within that 
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period--between August 1, 1993 and February 28, 1994. Hence, 
although precise periods of time are different, the period 
alleged in Count II fell entirely within the period alleged in 
Count I. The only other difference in the two counts is that 
Count I alleged that the value exceeded $5000 whereas Count II 
alleged that the value exceeded $1000. 
The State based the charge in Count I on a claimed 
failure by Giles to report that she was married. (R. 155:82.) 
It based Count II on a claimed failure to accurately report 
household composition and income. (R. 155:82.) The State 
attempted to prove both counts based on introduction of the forms 
filled out by Giles during the relevant time period and a 
conglomeration of testimony about the benefits she received. The 
two counts were not distinctly presented in the evidence or 
State's closing argument. Indeed, it requires a close and 
detailed reading of this record to distinguish which evidence is 
relevant to which count. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the crime of public assistance 
fraud occurred, such fraud was a single ongoing transaction with 
a general intent and single plan to obtain benefits. It is 
similar to Crosby where the State attempted unsuccessfully to 
charge separate counts based on the manner in which the thefts 
were conducted. The Supreme Court rejected that distinction. 
This Court's holding in Patience, 323 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
28-29, that acts of forgery are not consolidated does not 
undermine Giles' argument. The focus in a welfare fraud case is 
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on the receipt of overpayments. This focus is similar to that in 
theft cases. An individual who commits public assistance fraud 
during the given period of time is "motivated by one general 
intention and one plan." See id. The theft consolidation rule 
therefore applies to this public assistance fraud case. 
Moreover, unlike theft cases, a statute specifically 
directs the consolidation of counts where the public assistance 
fraud is committed "as part of the same facts and circumstances 
or a related series of facts and circumstances." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1206(2). The fraud alleged in this case is part of a 
related series of facts and circumstances. Giles periodically 
filled out the required forms. After Giles let the Department 
know that there was some confusion as to whether she had been 
married, the State perused those forms and decided that if Giles 
were married to Felicetti, she had failed to disclose information 
in two areas. Hence, the two counts were triggered by a single 
statement and based on the same act. Accordingly, the trial 
judge erred in refusing to consolidate. 
This error did not prejudice Giles since the trial judge 
dismissed Count I.11 The State is cross-appealing that 
11
 The trial judge's dismissal of Count I based on the State's 
failure to prove Giles was married was a correct ruling. Appellant 
anticipates addressing the propriety of that ruling in her 
reply/Cross-Appellee's brief following the State's filing of its 
brief as Appellee/Cross-Appellant. The consolidation of counts 
argument set forth in Point III is included for purposes of 
argument and in the event this Court disagrees with Giles and 
grants the State's cross-appeal. It is not meant as a concession 
and was included in Appellant's opening brief rather than Giles' 
reply brief/brief of Cross-Appellee to avoid complicating the issue 
with procedural arguments which might be made if Giles initially 
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decision. Assuming, arguendo, that the State is successful on 
that cross-appeal and Count I is reinstated, consolidation of 
Count I with any remaining count would be required.12 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
her conviction and dismiss the charge based on insufficient 
evidence as set forth in Point II. In the event this Court 
concludes that the evidence was sufficient, Appellant requests 
that her case be remanded for resentencing as a class B 
misdemeanor as set forth in Point I. Additionally, in the event 
the State is successful on its cross-appeal, Appellant 
respectfully requests that the case be remanded for sentencing on 
a single class B misdemeanor count. 
addressed this issue in her subsequent brief. 
12
 The proper remedy in the event this Court were to grant the 
State's cross-appeal would be to remand the case for sentencing on 
a single class B misdemeanor count regardless of whether this Court 
grants Giles' insufficiency claim in Point II of this brief. See 
Point I, supra at 21. At most, the charges in this case amounted 
to a single class B misdemeanor. As set forth in Point III, supra 
at 3 0-35, the counts should have been charged as a single count. 
As set forth in Point I, supra at 21-25, that single count is a 
class B misdemeanor. 
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SUBMITTED this JloX. day of November, 1997. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 2)s& day of 
November, 1997. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah Attorney General's Office as indicated above this day 
of November, 1997. 
36 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No ff^(9ni$Cpl 
Count No. 
Hnnnrahla h&t ) / f l <S ¥zmf 
Reporter 
Bailiff (IJI^^JCJL/JLL 
Date SShf y 
• The motion of_ . to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Q^a jury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea otno contest; of the offense of _ , a felony 
of the ^L-Taegree, • a class misdemeanour being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented byj\.Ltpi) ryalM >\G~ , and the State being represented by i2u>is now adjudged guilty 
tr$e of the above offense, is nsw sent nced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• le a maximum mandatory term of 
VH' not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
3t to exceed years; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ 
years and which may be life; 
to. 
such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s). .are hereby dismissed. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
OQr Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of e3/jo KV\p3- , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
• Commitment shall issue 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page 
(white-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yeliow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (Golden rod-State) 
Of 
0 0 012 9 
Judgment/State v. 
iB^Usual 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
J and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
D Serve 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing 
D Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or • at the rate of ^^ _ _ . 
Dxf*ay restitution in the amount of $ Ij43*/.; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or D at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
• Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or • with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or • with 
• Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
• Submit to drug testing. 
• Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
• Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
• Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
EKuomplete /frfc hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole.'/A. U ^ ^ &£> *~f)***— * 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
D Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
• Qpfendant is ordered to appear before this Court on ^ for a review of this sentence 
/ s fo pfu, A o 0.07Ajr/rujrf- > 4&_ tintf.. 37 *3nr> .m 
D 
• 
a 
DATED this -3 / day of 
Page of 
000130 
ADDENDUM B 
76-8-1203, Disclosure required — Penalty; 
(1) .Each person who applies for public assistance shall disclose to the state 
agency administering the public assistance each fact that may materially 
affect the determination of his eligibility to receive public assistance, including 
his current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
(2) Any person applying for public assistance who intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly fails to disclose any material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Any client who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to 
the state agency administering the public assistance any change in a material 
fact required to be disclosed under Subsection (1), within ten days after the 
date of the change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
ADDENDUM C 
ROBIN K. YOUNGBERG 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Thtro Juaiciai District 
NOV 2 5 1996 
By - ^ f f ^ V r ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KATHLEEN GILES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO REDUCE 
OFFENSE CHARGED 
Judge David Young 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, through counsel, and requests the court 
for an order reducing the offenses for which she is charged in the 
above-referenced case to Class B Misdemeanors pursuant to the Ruling 
in State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, (Ut. 1969) and to proceed with 
Defendant's trial accordingly. 
The defendant requests the opportunity to file a written 
memorandum in support of this motion prior to the motion hearing. 
20-DATED this day of November, 1996. 
ROBIN K 
Attorney 
. Ybtrat 
y f 9 / I 
GBERG 
D e f e n d a n t 
0 0 0 0 2 9 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Motion To Reduce Offense 
Charged to the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, 231 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this•<£% day of NOVEMBER, 
1996. ^ 
0 0 0 0 3 0 
II PRESENT OUT HERE. I DO HAVE A MOTION TO MAKE, 
21 HOWEVER. 
3 THE COURT: LET'S EXCUSE THE JURY. I'M 
4 SORRY WE'RE JUST RECONVENED. WE HAVE TO TAKE CARE 
5 OF A COUPLE OF MATTER OF LAW AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
61 THE STATE'S CASE. IF YOU WILL STEP OUTSIDE, OR IF 
7 YOU WILL JUST STEP INTO THE JURY ROOM, AND SEE THAT 
8 THE DOOR IS CLOSED AS YOU LEAVE. 
9 (JURY EXITS COURTROOM. PROCEEDINGS 
10 CONTINUE IN ABSENSE OF JURY.) 
11 THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW WE'RE 
12 CONVENED OUTSIDE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. 
13 MR. LJUNGBERG: THANKS, JUDGE. AT THIS 
14 POINT I HAVE A COUPLE OF MOTIONS TO MAKE, AS USUAL 
15 IN THESE SITUATIONS. 
16 THE FIRST MOTION I WOULD MAKE, JUDGE, IS 
17 FOR A JOINDER OF COUNT ONE AND COUNT TWO. THE BASIS 
18 FOR THAT MOTION IS THE FACT THAT THE AMOUNTS ALLEGED 
19 ARE PART OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE, IF YOU WILL, 
20 THAT TOOK PLACE OVER THE TIME PERIOD OF JULY OF '93 
21 UNTIL JULY OF '95. 
22 THE INFORMATION ALLEGES IN COUNT TWO A TIME 
23 PERIOD THAT IS ACTUALLY INCLUDED WITHIN THE LARGER 
24 TIME PERIOD, BUT IT CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
25 DURING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME TIME PERIOD. 
1 I'D LIKE TO REFER THE COURT TO THE 
2 DEFINITIONS CONTAINED IN THE CRIMINAL CODE. I HAVE 
3 A COPY HERE, I BELIEVE, IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF 
4I ARREARS. IF I MAY APPROACH. 
5 THE COURT: YOU MAY. I COULD LOOK IT UP. 
6 THAT'S FINE IF YOU HAVE A COURTESY COPY. THAT'S 
7 GREAT. 
8 MR. LJUNGBERG: I SURE DO. I REFER THE 
9 COURT TO 76-8-1206, WHICH TALKS ABOUT THE ELEMENTS 
10 AND ALSO THE AMOUNTS USED TO CALCULATE. IF I COULD 
11 FIND MY CODE HERE. THE AMOUNT USED TO CALCULATE THE 
12 PENALTY. SPECIFICALLY JUDGE, SUBSECTION 2 OF 
13 76-8-1206 STATES THAT FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 
14 ONE, THAT IS, DETERMINING THE SEVERITY OF THE 
15 OFFENSE, THE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD, THE VALUE OF 
16 IS CALCULATEED BY AGGREGATING THE VALUES OF EACH 
17 INSTANCE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE 
18 DEFENDANT AS PART OF THE SAME FACTS AND 
19 CIRCUMSTANCES OR A RELATED SERIES OF FACTS AND 
20 CIRCUMSTANCES. 
21 I WOULD ALSO TURN THE COURT TO THE 
22 DEFINITION OF OVERPAYMENT, WHICH IS LOCATED IN 
23 ANOTHER PART OF THE CODE. 
24 THE COURT: BEFORE YOU LEAVE THAT, THE 
25 FIRST OFFENSE FOR WHICH SHE'S CHARGED IN THIS CASE 
1 INDICATES AN EXCESS OF FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS PER 
2 SECOND DEGREE FELONY. THIS STATUTE SAYS IN EXCESS 
3 OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
4 MR. LJUNGBERG: THAT'S PROBABLY THE OLD— 
5 BEFORE THE CHANGE, JUDGE. 
6 THE COURT: THAT WAS BEFORE THE CHANGE? 
7 I'D BETTER NOT USE THAT STATUTE. 
8 MR. LJUNGBERG: THAT MAY BE FOR MY NEXT 
9 ARGUMENT. KEEP IT UP THERE. 
10 THE COURT: OKAY. 76-8-1206. 
11 MR. LJUNGBERG: RIGHT. THE COURT RECALLS 
12 IN '94 THE AMOUNTS AND CLASSIFICATIONS WERE AMENDED. 
13 THE COURT: RIGHT. OKAY. 76-8-1206. 
14 RIGHT. I'M WITH YOU ON THAT. NOW, PARAGRAPH TWO 
15 APPEARS TO BE THE SAME AS THAT WHICH YOU HAVE JUST 
16 READ. FOR THE PURPOSES OF YOUR ARGUMENT THAT IS 
17 CONSISTENT. ALL RIGHT. 
18 MR. LJUNGBERG: IT TALKS ABOUT, AS I SAID, 
19 AGGREGATING THE VALUES OF EACH INSTANCE OF PUBLIC 
20 ASSISTANCE FRAUD AS PART OF THE SAME FACTS OR 
21 RELATED SERIES OF FACTS, 
22I THE COURT: OKAY. 
23 MR. LJUNGBERG: CLEARLY HERE WE'RE DEALING 
24 WITH A RELATED SERIES OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. 
25 AND CERTAINLY WE ARE DEALING WITH THE SAME TIME 
1 PERIOD. IT'S THEREFORE OUR MOTION, JUDGE, THAT THE 
2 TWO COUNTS BE JOINED INTO ONE. I BELIEVE THAT WOULD 
3 CONSTITUTE A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. SO BASICALLY WE 
4 WOULD BE MERGING COUNT TWO INTO COUNT ONE. 
5 THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER IN ARGUMENT? 
6 MR. LJUNGBERG: NOT ON THIS ONE, JUDGE. 
7 THE COURT: ANY OTHER ARGUMENT? 
8 MR. LJUNGBERG: THE OTHER ONE I HAD IS A 
9 LITTLE LONGER. 
10 THE COURT: I DON'T WANT TO T A K E — I WANT 
11 TO GO WITH YOURS. 
12 MR. LJUNBERG: FAIR ENOUGH. THE SECOND 
13 ARGUMENT, JUDGE, HAS TO DO WITH MOTION THAT I FILED 
14 SOME TIME AGO. IT'S BASED ON STATE VS. SHONDELL. 
15 IT'S AN EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT. VERY BRIEFLY, 
16 JUDGE, I THINK THE COURT IS AWARE OF THE SHONDELL 
17 CASE, WHICH TALKS ABOUT A CONFLICT IN LEGISLATIVE 
18 ACTS WITH DOUBT OR UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE PUNISHMENT, 
19 REQUIRES THE BENEFIT, OF COURSE, GOING TO THE 
201 DEFENDANT. 
21 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
22 MR. LJUNGBERG: WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO AT 
23 THIS POINT, JUDGE, IS REFER YOU AGAIN UNDER THE 
24 CURRENT CODE TO SECTION 76-8-1203, AND SPECIFICALLY 
25 TO SUBSECTION THREE IN THIS CASE. WHAT IT DOES, IT 
1 STATES THERE THAT ANY RECIPIENT WHO INTENTIONALLY, 
2 KNOWINGLY, RECKLESSLY FAILS TO DISCLOSE TO THE 
3 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES ANY CHANGE IN MATERIAL 
4 FACT— AND OF COURSE THOSE FACTS, MATERIAL FACTS ARE 
5 LISTED IN SUBSECTION ONE, AND INCLUDE MARITAL 
6 STATUS, REQUIRED TO BE DISCLOSED UNDER SUBSECTION 
7 ONE, WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THE CHANGE, 
8 IS GUILTY OF A CLASS B. MISDEMEANOR. 
9 AND THIS IS THE IMPORTANT PART, JUDGE, "IF 
10 THAT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE RESULTS IN AN OVERPAYMENT." 
11 NOW, THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT SHE IS BEING CHARGED WITH. 
12 HOWEVER, SHE IS BEING CHARGED UNDER 76-8-1205, 
13 APPARENTLY UNDER SUBSECTION THREE, THAT SAYS, "ANY 
14 PERSON WHO RECEIVES AN UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT AS A 
15 RESULT OF THE ACTS DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION." 
16 NOWHERE IN THAT SECTION ~ THAT IS, 1205, 
17 ARE THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THIS CASE ENUMERATED. THE 
18 SPECIFIC ACTS ALLEGED IN THIS CASE ARE CLEARLY 
19 ENUMERATED IN 1203, THAT WHERE THERE IS AN 
20 OVERPAYMENT, THEN IT IS A CLASS B. MISDEMEANOR. 
21 AND NOW THIS HAS TO BE TAKEN IN THE 
22 HISTORICAL CONTEXT, JUDGE. I HAVE A COPY OF THE OLD 
23 CODE THAT THIS STATUTE THAT USED TO RULE IN THESE 
24 SORTS OF CASES ~ AND MAY I APPROACH. IT'S 62 A. 
25 9-128, 130. AND I HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THE SECTION, AND 
1 I HAVE A COPY FOR COUNSEL, AS WELL. NOW, UNDER THE 
2 PROVISIONS OF THE OLD CODE, PRIOR TO 1994, AS 
3 AMENDED, JUDGE, 128 MADE IT ILLLEGAL OR FOR ANY 
41 PERSON TO KNOWINGLY BY FALSE STATEMENT 
5 MISREPRESENTATION, IMPERSONATION OR UNDER FRAUDULENT 
6 MEANS TO NOT DISCLOSE CHANGES, MATERIAL CHANGES USED 
7 IN MAKING A DETERMINATION OF A PERSON'S ELIGIBILITY. 
81 OKAY. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, NOWHERE IN 128 
9 IS THERE A REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTUAL OVERPAYMENT BE 
10 MADE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE MERE FACT THAT -- THE 
11 MERE ACT OF FAILING TO DISCLOSE WAS A CLASS B. 
12 MISDEMEANOR. ALL RIGHT. 
13 NOW, IF YOU TURN TO SECTION 130 UNDER THE 
14 OLD CODE, IT PROVIDED THAT SUCH A FAILURE TO 
15 DISCLOSE THAT DID RESULT IN AN OVERPAYMENT OR IN 
16 DAMAGE OF SOME KIND TO THE GOVERNMENT, WAS TREATED 
17 DIFFERENTLY, AND THIS SCHEDULE OF AMOUNTS WILL BE 
18 APPLIED. 
19 AND THAT'S ALL RIGHT UNDERSTAND SHONDELL, 
20 BECAUSE THERE WAS AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT ABOUT THAT 
21 OVERPAYMENT BEING PAID, WHICH DISTINGUISHES 128 FROM 
22 130. NOW, WHEN THE LEGISLATURE AMENDED THIS PART OF 
23 THE CODE THEY ACTUALLY REPEALED IT. IF I MAY 
24 APPROACH AGAIN, JUDGE, THIS IS THE NEW CODE, THE 
25 SAME SECTION AS WAS REPEALED. 
1 AND THESE CASES ARE NOW GOVERNED BY WHAT 
2 YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU AS THE CURRENT CODE, WHICH 
3 IS 76-8-1203. NOW THE LEGISLATURE, FOR SOME REASONS 
4 THAT I MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE TO ARGUE TO YOU, HAS PUT 
5 IN TOTALLY BRAND NEW LANGUAGE THAT DID NOT APPEAR IN 
6 THE OLD CODE AT ALL. AND THAT IS, SUBSECTION 3 OF 
7 1203, WHICH AGAIN SPECIFIES THAT ANY RECIPIENT WHO 
8 INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY, OR RECKLESSLY FAILS TO 
9 DISCLOSE A MATERIAL FACT WITHIN TEN DAYS, IF THERE 
10 IS AN OVERPAYMENT, YOU SEE, IS GUILTY OF A CLASS B. 
Ill MISDEMEANOR. 
12 SO THEY HAVE ADDED AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT TO 
13 THE SIMPLE FAILURE TO DISCLOSE, REQUIRING THAT THERE 
14 BE AN OVERPAYMENT. 
15 NOW, THE LEGISLATURE HAS DONE THAT 
16 KNOWINGLY, APPARENTLY, AND I'M NOT HERE TO ARGUE 
17 ABOUT THE WISDOM OR NOT WISDOM. WHAT I AM HERE TO 
18 ARGUE IS THAT UNDER SECTION THREE, THAT THE ACTS 
19 ALLEGED IN THIS CASE ARE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED AS 
20 TO WHAT MS. GILES HAS DONE HERE, SPECIFICALLY, 
21 RATHER THAN THE GENERAL LANGUAGE THAT THE STATE IS 
22 TRYING TO PROSECUTE HER UNDER. 
23 AND AS YOU CAN TELL, THE SAME ELEMENTS IN 
241 THIS CASE COULD BE USED TO ALLEGE A SECOND DEGREE 
25 FELONY, OR A CLASS B. MISDEMEANOR WITH THE SAME 
1 ELEMENTS. 
2 CLEARLY, JUDGE, UNDER SHONDELL AND IT'S 
3 IT'S PROGENY, THAT IS INAPPROPRIATE. THE COURT 
4 NEEDS TO ALSO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT A SPECIFIC 
5 STATUTE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO A DEFENDANT, RATHER 
61 THAN A GENERAL STATE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A PERSON 
7 FORGES A PRESCRIPTION, THEY ARE FORGING A DOCUMENT, 
8 WITH AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD. 
9 HOWEVER, I HAVE CLEAR CASES — A CLEAR 
10 CASE HERE, JUDGE, STATE VERSUS LOVELESS, I BELIEVE 
11 IS THE CASE. AND IF THE COURT WANTS TO REVIEW IT — 
12 NO, THAT'S NOT IT. I HAVE A CASE IN THERE THAT IT'S 
13 CLEAR THAT A PERSON WHO'S CHARGED WITH FORGING A 
14 PRESCRIPTION CAN'T GO BACK AND GET THAT CONVICTION 
15 OVERTURNED BY SAYING, I FEEL I'M GUILTY OF THE MORE 
16 GENERAL CRIME OF FORGERY, BUT I'M BEING CHARGED WITH 
17 AGGRAVATED — A MORE SERIOUS CRIME, OR SOMETHING 
18 LIKE THAT, BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE HAS ELECTED TO 
19 MAKE A SPECIFIC CRIME OF FORGING A PRESCRIPTION. OR 
20 PERHAPS FORGING A CREDIT CARD. 
21 IT'S SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE GENERAL 
22 CRIME OF FORGERY. I WOULD ARGUE, JUDGE, THAT THE 
23 LEGISLATURE IN ASSESSING THESE OTHER SORTS OF CASES 
24 AND WHERE A RECIPIENT OF WELFARE FAILS TO DISCLOSE 
25 INFORMATION AND GETS AN OVERPAYMENT, THAT THEY FELT 
1 THAT THE PENALTIES WERE EITHER TOO HARSH OR THAT A 
2 RECIPIENT SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY THAN A 
3 PERSON, A MERE PERSON. 
4 OKAY. OF COURSE THE RECIPIENT IS DEFINED 
5 RIGHT ABOVE THERE, MEANING A PERSON WHO HAS RECEIVED 
6 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. MY ARGUMENT, JUDGE, IS THAT THE 
7 LEGISLATURE IS INTENDING MS. GILES' SITUATION TO BE 
8 TREATED LESS HARSHLY THAN A PERSON WHO IS NOT 
9 ELIGIBLE FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, AND WHO GOES IN 
10 THERE AND FALSIFIES INFORMATION IN ORDER TO RIP THE 
11 GOVERNMENT OFF FOR MONEY THEY'RE NOT ENTITLED TO. 
12 THE EVIDENCE HERE IS THAT SHE IS A 
13 RECIPIENT, SOMEONE WHO IS OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE, AND 
14 HAS FAILED TO DISCLOSE FACTS, AND SO SHOULD BE 
15 TREATED DIFFERENTLY. 
16 AND THE REASON THAT I WOULD GIVE THE COURT 
17 IS THAT IF I WENT IN AND FALSIFIED INFORMATION, TO 
18 GET BENEFITS, AND I WAS NOT OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE FOR 
19 THOSE BENEFITS, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE A MUCH 
20 MORE DIFFICULT TIME RECOVERING THAT MONEY FROM ME 
21 BECAUSE I WAS NOT OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE. 
22 NOW, IN A RECIPIENT CASE, THEY ARE GETTING 
23 MONEY ALL THE TIME, AND SO IT IS EASIER FOR THE 
24 GOVERNMENT TO REPAY THESE OVERPAYMENT AMOUNTS. AND 
25 THAT'S — I MEAN, OF COURSE WE DON'T HAVE GROSS 
1 NEGLIGENCE, WHERE SOMETHING IS FAIRLY CLEAR ON ITS 
2 FACE, BUT I WOULD SIMPLY ARGUE THAT THAT IS ONE 
3 POSSIBLE REASON THAT THE LEGISLATURE CHANGED THE LAW 
41 IN 1994 AND ADDED THIS SECTION THAT SIMPLY DOES NOT 
5 APPEAR ANYWHERE UNDER THE OLD CODE. 
6 CLEARLY SEEMS TO TALK ABOUT THE KIND OF 
7 CONDUCT THAT IS ALLEGED IN THIS CASE VERY 
8 SPECIFICALLY. I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO SEND THIS TO 
9 THE JURY, UNDER 1203-3, THE MORE SPECIFIC STATUTE. 
10 THE COURT: WHICH IS A CLASS B 
111 MISDEMEANOR. 
12 MR. LJUNGBERG: WHICH IS A CLASS B 
13 MISDEMEANOR, JUDGE. 
14 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
15 MR. LJUNBERG: THANK YOU. 
16 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND YOUR ARGUMENT. 
17 GO AHEAD, MR. BAER. 
18 MR. BAER: THANK YOU, JUDGE. I WILL 
19 ADDRESS THE MOTIONS IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE 
20 PRESENTED. FIRST WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINDER, OF 
21 COURSE THE STATE OBJECTS TO THAT MOTION, AND VERY 
22 CLEARLY — CLEAR LANGUAGE THAT WAS CITED BY DEFENSE 
23 COUNSEL IN 76-38-1206 SUB.2. AND AND I WILL READ IT 
24 AGAIN FOR CLARITY. 
25 "FOR PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION 1, THE VALUE OF 
1 THE OFFENSE IS CALCULATEED BY AGGREGATING THE VALUES 
2 OF BACH INSTANCE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD BY THE 
3 DEFENDANT AS PART OF THE SAME FACTS AND 
4 CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATED SERIES OF FACTS AND 
5 CIRCUMSTANCES." 
6 NOW, DEFENSE COUNSEL EMPHASIZED THE FIRST 
7 PART OF THE LANGUAGE, THE VERB, I GUESS, AGGREGATE. 
8 BUT TOTALLY DISMISSED THE CONCEPT OF THE SAME FACTS. 
9 WE DON'T HAVE THE SAME FACTS, WE HAVE TWO SEPARATE— 
10 TOTALLY SEPARATE FRAUD ACTIONS, AND I DON'T KNOW WHY 
11 THE DEFENSE WOULD WOULD WANT TO LUMP THEM TOGETHER, 
12 BECAUSE IF THEY ARE PREVAIL ON THIS MARRIAGE ISSUE, 
13 IT'S LIKE DROPPING A PINCH OF CYANIDE INTO A 
14 RESERVOIR; YOU POISON THE WELL, AS IT WERE. 
15 BUT THEY ARE TOTALLY SEPARATE FRAUDS. ONE 
16 CAN MISREPRESENT THE HOUSEHOLD CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 
17 MARRIAGE, AND RECEIVE THE BENEFIT, AND HAVE NOTHING 
18 TO DO WITH INCOME. WE HAVE HAD EVIDENCE WHICH 
19 PLACES THIS DEFENDANT IN THE HOME. BY WAY OF 
20 DOCUMENTS. AT LEAST WE HAVE THE APARTMENT MANAGER 
21 TESTIFY THAT THIS PERSON IS PRESENT, THAT HE LIVED 
22 THERE. 
23 IN FACT, SHE LISTS HIM LATER ON IN THE 
24 PROGRAM AS BOYFRIEND LIVING IN THE HOME. 
25 INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN THOSE TWO REVIEWS IT'S 
1 EXHIBITS 6 AND 7, THAT RELATE TO THE TIME PERIOD THE 
2 FRAUD BECAUSE OF EMPLOYMENT, HE'S NOT LISTED AT ALL. 
3 YET WE CAN PLACE HIM IN THE HOME AND WORKING. 
4 SO IT'S A TOTALLY SEPARATE FRAUD. I DON'T 
5 THINK THAT THE LEGISLATURE NOR THE COURTS INTENDED 
6 OR SHOULD INTEND TO CONDONE A CHEAPER BY THE POUND 
7 MENTALITY THAT IF YOU COMMIT TWO FRAUDS IT'S JUST 
8 THE SAME AS ONE FRAUD AND THREE FRAUDS. ONE FRAUD, 
9 A HUNDRED FRAUDS, THEY ARE SEPARATE. 
10 THE COURT: I GUESS WHAT I NEED TO DO IS 
11 AT THIS POINT LOOK AT YOUR ELEMENTS INSTRUCTIONS 
12 THAT YOU'RE ASKING FOR. THAT'S PROBABLY WHAT WOULD 
13 GIVE ME THE HELP ON THIS QUESTION. THE THING THAT I 
14 AM UNDERSTANDING, AT THE END OF THE CASE, IS THAT 
15 YOU'RE CLAIMING THAT SHE HAS DEFRAUDED THE 
16 GOVERNMENT OUT OF BENEFITS IN THREE CATEGORIES, AND 
17 THOSE THREE CATEGORIES INCLUDE MEDICAL, THEY INCLUDE 
18 FOOD STAMPS, AND THEY INCLUDE FAMILY SUPPORT. 
19 AND THE FRAUD IS BASED IN PART UPON THE 
20 FACT THAT SHE HAS LISTED MR. FELICETTI AS A 
21 BOYFRIEND INSTEAD OF AS A HUSBAND. 
22 MR. BAER: FOR THE FIRST COUNT, YOUR 
23 HONOR. FOR THE SECOND COUNT WE HAVE HIM PLACED IN 
24 THE HOME, WE HAVE HIM EMPLOYED, STRICTLY IN THE 
25 SHORTER TIME PERIOD, AND SHE DOES NOT REPORT HIS 
II INCOME. AND THAT AFFECTS A DIFFERENT PROGRAM. 
21 THE COURT: IN TERMS OF TESTIMONY THAT WE 
3 HAVE HEARD. YOU HAVE RESTED NOW. 
4 MR. BAER: RIGHT. 
5 THE COURT: IN TERMS OF COUNT TWO, WHAT IS 
6 AFFECTED AND WHERE IS THE TESTIMONY AS TO WHAT SHE 
7 HAS RECEIVED FROM THAT FRAUD? 
8 MR. BAER: MR. YEI TESTIFIED THAT FROM 
9 AUGUST 1ST, '93 TO FEBRUARY 28, '94 UNDER THE FOOD 
10 STAMP PROGRAM, BASED UPON UNREPORTED EARNED INCOME, 
11 THERE WAS A FRAUD OF $1,124. THAT'S A SEPARATE 
12 ISSUE. AS OPPOSED TO THE TIME PERIOD OF JULY 1ST, 
13 1993 TO JULY 31, '95, THAT THERE WAS A. F. D. C. AND 
14 FAMILY MCEDICAL PROGRAMS. AND THAT GETS TO THE 
15 CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER 76-1206-72. DIFFERENT 
16 CIRCUMSTANCES OF DIFFERENT PROGRAMS. 
17 THERE'S ALL KINDS OF DIFFERENCES HERE. 
18 WE'RE NOT ARBITRARILY SEPARATING OUT THE SAME FACTS 
19 AND CIRCUMSTANCES TO REACH A DIFFERENT CHARGE. 
20 AND THE STATE WOULD EMPHASIZE ITS POSITION 
21 THAT IT DOESN'T BELIEVE THAT BY COMMITTING SEPARATE, 
22 DISTINCT FRAUDS, THAT ONE, AS A DEFENDANT ENJOYS THE 
23 BENEFIT OF LUMPING THOSE TOGETHER AT THEIR 
24 DISCRETION. AND THAT WOULD SUM UP THE STATE'S 
25 POSITION WITH RESPECT TO JOINDER. 
1 WE WOULD VOCIFEROUSLY OBJECT TO A JOINDER 
2 BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT FACTS, DISTINCT 
3 CIRCUMSTANCES, DIFFERENT INFORMATION, DIFFERENT 
41 PROGRAMS THAT WERE TESTIFIED TO IN THE STATE'S CASE. 
5 NOW, SHALL I MOVE ON? 
61 THE COURT: LET ME LOOK AT THE ELEMENTS 
7 INSTRUCTION THAT YOU'RE ASKING FOR. IN THE ELEMENTS 
81 YOU ARE ASKING THAT ON OR BETWEEN JULY 1 '93 AND 
9 JULY 1, '95, KATHLEEN GILES INTENTIONALLY— ETC. AND 
10 FAILURE TO DISCLOSE — RESULTED IN OVERPAYMENT. AND 
11 THE VALUE EXCEEDED FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS. OKAY. 
12 NOW, THAT PERIOD OF TIME COVERS, 
13 PRESUMABLY, WHAT YOU'RE TELLING ME ARE THREE 
14 OVERPAYMENTS IN THE SENSE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, 
15 IN THE SENSE OF FOOD STAMPS, AND IN THE SENSE OF 
16 MEDICALS. 
17 NOW, THE NEXT INSTRUCTION YOU ARE GIVING AS 
18 TO COUNT ONE IS THAT BETWEEN AUGUST 1, '93 AND 
19 FEBRUARY '94, BOTH OF WHICH TIMES ARE WITHIN THE 
20 COUNT ONE TIME PERIOD, YOU ARE SAYING KATHLEEN 
21 GILES — AND THEN YOU HAVE GOT — LOOKS TO ME LIKE 
22 ALL THE SAME ELEMENTS — AND RECEIVED BENEFITS IN 
23 EXCESS OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS. THOSE LOOK TO ME 
24 LIKE THE ONLY THING YOU'VE CHANGED IS THE DATES AND 
25 THE AMOUNTS. 
JJ MR. BAER: NO, YOUR HONOR. THERE IS 
2 MARITAL STATUS. AND THE FIRST ELEMENT, IN PARAGRAPH 
3 TWO, WHICH IS HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND INCOME IN 
41 PARAGRAPH TWO, AND THOSE REFLECT DIRECTLY FROM 1203 
5 SUB. 1, WHICH INDICATE MARITAL STATUS UNDER A, 
6 HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION AND INCOME, SUB. B. 
7 RESPECTIVELY. SO THOSE ARE IN THE STATUTE. 
8 THE COURT: LET ME GET THAT LANGUAGE. SO 
9 YOU'RE SAYING— 
10 MR. BAER: PARAGRAPH TWO. I'LL GO BACK 
11 TO THE — 
12 THE COURT: PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE FIRST 
13 ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION INVOLVING THE JULY 1, •93 TO 
14 JULY 31, '94. 
15 MR. BAER: CORRECT. 
16 THE COURT: I SEE RIGHT AT THE END, 
17 MARITAL STATUS. OKAY. 
18 MR. BAER: WHICH IS DIRECTLY IN THE 
19 STATUTE. 
20 THE COURT: AND THEN, TO WIT: HOUSEHOLD 
21 COMPOSITION AND INCOME IS IN THE SECOND ONE. 
22 MR. BAER: RIGHT. BECAUSE OF THESE 
23 CHANGES IN THE HOUSE AND IN THAT SHORT OF TIME 
241 PERIOD HE HAS INCOME AND DOESN'T REPORT IT. IT IS A 
25 DIFFERENT FRAUD, AND IT'S BEEN SPECIFICALLY 
1 ENUMERATED UNDER SECTION 76-8-1203. 
2 THE COURT: AND YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE 
3 TESTIMONY OF MR. YEI APPLIED TO THE FOOD STAMP 
41 PORTION FROM THE AUGUST TO FEBRUARY PERIOD OF TIME, 
5 IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,400. 
6 MR. BAER: THAT'S RIGHT, YOUR HONOR. 
7 THE COURT: PLUS— 
8 MR. BAER: AND I DIDN'T — PERHAPS THIS 
9 IS MY SHORTCOMING, BUT WE DIDN'T TALK IN TERMS OF 
10 COUNTS, BUT I THINK IT'S CLEAR WE HAVE TWO COUNTS, 
11 TWO TIME PERIODS. ONE MAY BE WITHIN THE— THERE'S 
12 DIFFERENT FACTS THAT LEAD TO THAT. I DON'T THINK 
13 THAT THE SIMILARITY IN TIME PERIOD ALONE IS 
14 DISPOSITIVE OF THE POSITION. 
15 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. DID YOU DESIRE TO 
16 BE HEARD IN REPLY ON THE MOTION IN RELATION TO THE 
17 JOINDER ISSUE? 
18 MR. LJUNBERG: JUST BRIEFLY, JUDGE, TO 
19 REPLY. I'M GLAD THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS FINALLY 
20 SPECIFIED HOW HE'S THESE PROVING HIS CASE THROUGH 
21 NOTES AND BASED ON HIS ARGUMENT THERE, AND HIS 
22 ELEMENTS. I WOULD MOVE TO SIMPLY DISMISS COUNT ONE 
23 IN IT'S ENTIRETY, BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE HAS 
24 BEEN NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED OF A VALID MARRIAGE IN 
25 THIS CASE. 
1 COUNT ONE IS BASED ENTIRELY AND THE FACT OF 
2 A MARRIAGE. IF THE COURT RECALLS, THE ONLY EVIDENCE 
3 THAT HAS COME IN AS TO THE THE MARRIAGE IS THE 
4 MARRIAGE LICENSE, WHICH THE STATE'S OWN WITNESS 
5 STATED WAS NOT A VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE. AND WAS 
6 THEREFORE NOT A SYMBOL OF A VALID MARRIAGE. 
7 THAT'S BEEN THE ONLY EVIDENCE, LEGAL 
8 EVIDENCE, AS TO A VALID LEGAL UNION, NOT SIMPLY A 
9 CEREMONY, WHICH IS NOT ENOUGH TO MAKE A VALID 
10 MARRIAGE. CLEARLY. 
11 THE STATE'S OWN WITNESS FAILED TO TESTIFY 
12 THAT THERE WAS A LEGAL MARRIAGE IN THIS CASE, AND 
13 THE STATE'S OWN EXHIBIT, WHICH I OFFERED, THE 
14 MARRIAGE LICENSE, IS NOT COMPLETED, AND THEREFORE 
15 UNDER THE STATE'S THEORY ON COUNT ONE, COUNT ONE 
16 MUST BE DISMISSED. 
17 THE COURT: HOW DO OVERCOME THAT ONE? 
18 MR. BAER: JUDGE, A WHOLE LOT OF WAYS. 
19 THERE'S PLENTY OF EVIDENCE AS TO THE MARRIAGE IN 
20 THIS SITUATION. 
21 THE COURT: HAS ANYBODY CONTACTED THE 
22 MARRIAGE DEPARTMENT TO SEE IF YOU CAN GET A 
23 CERTIFIED COPY OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE? 
24 MR. BAER: YES, WE HAVE. WE HAVE BEEN 
25 UNABLE TO THAT TODAY, YOUR HONOR. BUT I WOULD DRAW 
1 THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO THIS — 
21 THE COURT: YOU HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO IT 
3 ANY DAY? 
41 MR. BAER: WELL— 
5 THE COURT: BECAUSE THERE ISN'T ONE? 
6 MR. BAER: THEY'VE BEEN UNABLE TO LOCATE 
7 ONE. THEIR FILES ARE ASKEW. BUT LISTEN, YOUR 
8 HONOR, 76-8-1203 TALKS ABOUT MARITAL STATUS. 
9 DOESN'T SPEAK TO — IT SPEAKS TO DISCLOSURE — 
10 HONEST DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. 
11 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
12 MR. BAER: AS TO THE MARITAL STATUS OF 
13 THE THIS DEFENDANT. AND THE TESTIMONY IS CLEAR THAT 
14 A PERSON WHO — WHO WAS ORDAINED TO PERFORM A 
15 MARRIAGE, PERFORMED THE MARRIAGE IN ALL THE 
16 NECESSARY WAYS AND FASHIONS. HE TESTIFIED, AND WE 
17 HAVE IN EVIDENCE THE APPLICATION, WHICH IS SIGNED BY 
18 THIS DEFENDANT. THEN WE HAVE THE TESTIMONY THAT THE 
19 FINAL PAPERWORK IS HANDED TO THIS DEFENDANT. 
20 NOW, THE DEFENDANT DECIDES, APPARENTLY, TO 
21 HOLD THIS INFORMATION. DOESN'T SUBMIT IT. SO WHAT 
22 YOU ARE DOING IS CONDONING AN END-RUN ON THE 
23 TECHNICALITY OF— 
24 THE COURT: NOW WAIT A MINUTE. DON'T 
25 ACCUSE ME OF THAT. 
1 MR. BAER: I'M SORRY. THE ARGUMENT 
21 APPEARS TO CONDONE AN END-RUN, WHERE THE EVIDENCE 
3 POINTS TO THE DEFENDANT WITHHOLDING THIS INFORMATION 
41 AND NOT FILING IT. IT'S TRYING TO HAVE YOUR CAKE 
5 AND EAT IT TOO. 
6 THE COURT: LET ME JUST SAY THIS: I'VE 
7 PERFORMED TENS IF NOT HUNDREDS OF MARRIAGES, AND 
8 I'VE NEVER GIVEN THE DOCUMENTS BACK TO THE PEOPLE TO 
9 FILE, AS THE WITNESS TESTIFIED. IT ALMOST WAS AS 
10 THOUGH HE DIDN'T WANT TO BUY THE STAMP, SO HE GAVE 
11 IT BACK TO THEM, SO IF THEY WANTED TO GET MARRIED 
12 THEY COULD SEND IT IN. IF SOMEBODY DOESN'T SEND IT 
13 IN, I RECOGNIZE THAT THAT'S THE PURPOSES OF COURTS, 
14 AND LITIGATION, AND TRIALS. 
15 BUT YOU LOOK AT THOSE THINGS AND YOU SAY, 
16 ALL RIGHT, WELL, LET'S LOOK AT THE POSITION THEY ARE 
17 TAKING BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE. NOW, A 
18 POSITION IN A CRIMINAL CASE IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT 
19 WITH THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAN IT WOULD BE IF I WERE 
20 DEALING WITH ISSUES OF THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY. OR 
21 EVEN SPOUSAL SUPPORT. 
22 BUT IF YOU LOOK AT THAT DOCUMENT, FOR 
23 INSTANCE, ALL YOU'VE GIVEN OR THAT'S BEEN FILED 
24 HERE, WHICH CAME APPARENTLY FROM YOUR FILE TO THE 
25 DEFENDANT, IS THE BACK SIDE. IT'S NOT A MARRIAGE 
1 LICENSE, IT'S A MARRIAGE APPLICATION, AND THE BACK 
2 SIDE AT THE BOTTOM HAS NEVER BEEN FILLED OUT, WHICH 
3 IS ESSENTIAL. AND EVEN IF HE GAVE IT BACK TO THE 
4 PEOPLE TO SEND IN, HE DIDN'T EVEN FILL OUT THAT 
5 CRITICAL PORTION AT THE BOTTOM OF IT, SAYING THAT HE 
6 PERFORMED THE WEDDING. 
7 THEN HE COMES IN HERE AND TESTIFIED THAT HE 
8 DID. BUT ALL THE WEDDINGS I HAVE EVER PERFORMED, 
9 THAT PART OF IT IS FILLED OUT AFTERWARDS AND SENT 
10 BACK. AND THAT'S NOT FILLED OUT. SO IF IT'S VALID 
11 FOR ONLY A CERTAIN PERIOD OR WINDOW OF TIME, THEN IT 
12 EXPIRES, UNFORTUNATE AS THAT MAY APPEAR TO YOU, YOUR 
13 CLIENTS AREN'T DISCHARGED IN THE SENSE THAT THEY 
14 HAVE LOST A CIVIL REMEDY. THEY ARE DISCHARGED IN 
15 THE SENSE THAT THEY HAVE — THERE IS A REASONABLE 
16 DOUBT ON A CRIMINAL REMEDY. 
17 MR. BAER: JUDGE, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT 
18 AT THIS POINT, OF COURSE, WE'RE OBVIOUSLY AT THE END 
19 OF THE STATE'S CASE, AND THE INFERENCES ARE RENDERED 
20 TO THE BENEFIT OF THE STATE, AND THERE IS A 
21 PREPONDERANCE STANDARD AT THIS JUNCTURE. 
22 THE COURT: A PREPONDERANCE STANDARD AT 
23 THIS JUNCTURE? 
24 MR. BAER: NO, BUT A — BUT THERE'S NOT 
25 BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD. THERE IS CLEAR 
1 AND CONVINCING, PERHAPS, IF I RECALL THE STANDARD. 
2 BUT IT'S — ALL INFERENCES ASCERTAIN TO THE BENEFIT 
3 OF THE STATE AT THE END OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
4 THE COURT: RIGHT. I WOULD PROBABLY — I 
5 WILL JUST BE CANDID WITH YOU. I WILL PROBABLY TAKE 
6 UNDER ADVISEMENT THAT PARTICULAR MOTION AND LET IT 
7 GO TO THE JURY AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS. BUT I WILL 
8 TELL YOU, I HAVE SOME VERY SERIOUS RESERVATIONS 
9 ABOUT ALLOWING THE MARITAL ASPECT OF THIS UNDER THE 
10 CIRCUMSTANCES HERE. THIS IS A CRIMINAL CASE. IT 
11 DOESN'T CHANGE THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO COLLECT 
12 CIVIL, BUT I HAVE SOME SERIOUS RESERVATION ABOUT 
13 THAT ASPECT OF THE CASE. 
14 MR. BAER: WOULD YOU CARE FOR ME TO 
15 ADDRESS THE SHONDELL ISSUE? 
16 THE COURT: YES. 
17 MR. BAER: OKAY. WITH RESPECT TO THE 
18 SHONDELL, I HAVE A PROCEDURAL AND A SUBSTANTIVE 
19 ARGUMENT. AND PROCEDURALLY, YOUR HONOR, THE COURT 
20 MAY RECALL THAT WE HAD SET THE MOTION DATE FOR THIS 
21 FEBRUARY 18. I'M SORRY, THAT'S THE TRIAL DATE. WE 
22 HAD THE MOTION HEARING EARLIER THAN THAT. 
23 I BELIEVE IT WAS A MEMO IN DECEMBER OF '96 
24 OR RESPONSE AND REPLY MEMO DUE THEREAFTER. AND 
25 DEFENDANT HAS NOT FILED ANY OF THESE MEMOS. 
1 NEITHER THE ORIGINAL MEMO NOR, OBVIOUSLY, A REPLY 
2 MEMO. THE STATE'S POSITION WOULD BE THAT THAT ISSUE 
3 PREVIOUSLY RAISED, NOT SUBSTANTIVELY ARGUED, HAS 
4 BEEN WAIVED UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND TO 
5 DELIVER AN AD HOC KIND OF CONSIDERATION AT THIS TIME 
6 IS NEITHER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS COURT'S ORDER, 
7 NOR WITH FULL FLUSHING OUT OF THE FACTS OR THE 
8 STATUS OF THE LAW IN THAT AREA. 
9 IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO FOLLOW THAT ARGUMENT, 
10 THE STATE WOULD POINT OUT THAT I'M SURE THERE IS — 
11 THE COURT IS AWARE THAT UNDER SHONDELL AND ITS 
12 PROGENY, PARTICULARLY STATE VERSUS VOIT, WHICH IS 
13 824 P2D.455, A COURT OF APPEALS CASE, 1991, THAT THE 
14 ELEMENTS HAVE TO BE WHOLLY DUPLICATIVE. WHOLLY 
15 DUPLICATIVE. 
16 IN CASES SUCH AS SHONDELL YOU HAVE THE 
17 EXACT SAME LANGUAGE. THEN THERE IS UNFETTERED 
18 DISCRETION. I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT A 
19 LESSER-INCLUDED. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT UNFETTERED 
20 DISCRETION. WE HAVE ADDED ANOTHER ELEMENT BY THE 
21 DOLLAR AMOUNT, AND THAT'S WHAT WE HAVE IN SECTION 
22 1206, AND THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT THERE, AND 
23 THERE IS A DOLLAR AMOUNT. 
24 AND I DON'T THINK THE LEGISLATURE WOULD 
25 HAVE WOULD PUT THAT IF IT DIDN'T WANT TO DESCRIBE A 
1 FRAUD AS BEING THE SAME. IN FACT, 1206 IS AN EVEN 
2 MORE SPECIFIC STATUTE THAN THE OTHERS WITH RESPECT 
3 TO THE DOLLAR AMOUNTS. VERY SPECIFIC. IT HAS 
4 DOLLARS RIGHT IN IT. 
5 THE COURT: OKAY. 
6 MR. BAER: THE ONLY COMMENT THAT DEFENSE 
7 COUNSEL MADE WITH REGARDS TO RECIPIENT VERSUS REAL 
8 PERSON, AND THIS IS— WE DON'T HAVE THE LEGISLATIVE 
9 RESEARCH BEFORE THE COURT OR ANY MEMOS INDICATING 
10 INTENT, BUT I DON'T THINK THAT IT'S REASONABLE TO 
111 ASSUME THAT THE LEGISLATURE IS GOING TO CONSIDER A 
12 RECIPIENT AND REAL PERSON WHOLLY DISTINCT FROM EACH 
13 OTHER. 
14 OR IF THEY DO, THEY'D GIVE THE ADDED 
15 BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT TO THE RECIPIENT, AS OPPOSED TO 
16 THE HYPOTHETICAL REAL PERSON. 
17 THE COURT: THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR JOINDER 
18 OF COUNTS ONE AND TWO IS DENIED. THE DEFENSE MOTION 
19 FOR REDUCING THIS TO A CLASS B. MISDEMEANOR ON THE 
20 THEORY OF STATE VERSUS SHONDELL IS DENIED. FIRST, 
21 FOR THE REASON THAT THAT THE DEFENSE DID NOT PROVIDE 
22 THIS IN A TIMELY MANNER? 
23 MR. LJUNGBERG: JUDGE, I'M— CAN I HAVE A 
24 MOMENT TO RESPOND AFTER YOU'RE FINISHED? I NEED TO 
25 RESPOND TO THAT. 
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1 THE COURT: OKAY. I WILL LET YOU DEAL 
21 WITH THAT, MR. LJUNGBERG. BUT THERE WAS A MOTION IN 
3 THE FILE AND THERE WAS NEVER A MEMORANDUM THAT WAS 
4 FILED IN SUPPORT OF THAT MOTION. 
5 NOW, I WILL PROVIDE YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
6 RESPOND TO THAT, BUT THE COURT I WILL TELL YOU, I AM 
7 A BIT FRUSTRATED MYSELF TO FIND A COMPLEX ARGUMENT 
8 OF THIS NATURE, ANALYZING MULTIPLE STATUTORY 
9 PROVISIONS BEING ADDRESSED ORALLY WITHOUT GIVING ME 
10 ANY OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE STATUTES IN ADVANCE. 
11 I'LL TELL YOU THAT THERE IS ONE OTHER THING 
12 THAT IS OF CONCERN TO ME ABOUT THIS WHOLE SHONDELL 
13 THEORY AND ARGUMENT AND, THAT IS, I DON'T KNOW THAT 
14 ANYBODY HAS BRIEFED THE ISSUE OF WHEN THE LAW WAS 
15 CHANGED IN 1995 AND THE FACT SITUATION OCCURRED IN 
16 1993 TO 1995, WHETHER WE HAVE LOOKED INTO IT TO SEE 
17 IF SHE WOULD BE ENTITLED UNDER MY JUDGEMENT TO THE 
18 BETTER OF THE TWO STATUTES UNDER THE THEORY OF 
19 SHONDELL. 
20 WHICH — I DON'T KNOW, I GUESS THE EARLIER 
21 STATUTE WITH THE PENALTY PROVISION IN SECOND DEGREE 
22 BEING A THOUSAND DOLLARS, IT MAY BE THAT SHE'S 
23 ALREADY GOTTEN THE BENEFIT OF THAT BECAUSE THE 
24 AMOUNT'S GONE UP. BUT THERE WERE COMPLEX LEGAL 
25 ISSIES IN THIS CASE THAT I'M FRUSTRATED THAT I 
II DIDN'T GET ANY BETTER PREPARATION FOR, IN TERMS OF A 
2 MEMORANDUM BEING FILED. 
3 AND I WILL SAY THIS TO YOU, I RECOGNIZE 
4 THAT THERE ARE INCREDIBLE PRESSURES UPON L.D.A, BUT 
5 THAT STILL IS AN ISSUE. AND I'M NOT FAULTING YOU, 
6 NECESSARILY, I'M JUST SAYING THAT I DIDN'T FEEL LIKE 
7 I HAD ADEQUATE PREPERATION FOR THAT MOTION. NOW LET 
8 ME HEAR YOUR RESPONSE. 
9 MR. LJUNGBERG: MAY I RESPOND TO THAT? 
10 THE COURT: YES. 
11 MR. LJUNGBERG: IF YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT 
12 AD HOC, JUDGE, I LOOK AT THE INFORMATION THAT IS 
13 FILED IN THIS CASE. THE INFORMATION FILED IN THIS 
14 CASE IS FROM A STATUTE THAT WAS REPEALED BY THE TIME 
15 HE FILED HIS INFORMATION. 
16 IF YOU THEN WANT TO TALK ABOUT AD HOC, THAT 
17 INFORMATION DOES NOT GIVE ME ADEQUATE NOTICE. IF 
18 YOU RECALL, WE CAME IN FOR THE MOTION HEARING, 
19 JUDGE, AND I SAID, "I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY ARE 
20 ALLEGING THIS THING." 
21 DID YOU GET A LOOK AT HIS — WHAT HE WANTS 
22 THE JURY INSTRUCTED ON THIS CASE? IN HIS ELEMENTS? 
23 YESTERDAY? I'VE TOLD HIM — THEY USED THE EXPIRED, 
24 REPEALED STATUTORY LANGUAGE. IT IS NOT MY 
25 RESPONSIBILITY TO ALERT SOMEBODY USING EXPIRED 
1 STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO THE FACT THAT HE'S USING 
2 EXPIRED STATUTOTY LANGUAGE. 
3 THAT'S THE REASON I DIDN'T FILE A 
4 MEMORANDUM IN THIS CASE. I DIDN'T KNOW HOW HE WAS 
5 CHARGING THIS. WHY SHOULD I GIVE HIM THE ABILITY TO 
6 LOOK AT MY RESEARCH AND SAY, "HOLY SMOKES, I'M IN 
7 SERIOUS TROUBLE HERE." IF HE'S GOING UNDER THE OLD 
8 STATUTE, I BELIEVE I CAN — SHOULD WIN THIS. AND AS 
9 FAR AS WAIVING THIS THING, YOU CAN BRING UP A 
10 SHONDELL MOTION AT SENTENCING. 
11 THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. AND LET ME JUST 
12 SAY THIS, THAT I'M NOT BY THIS RULING DENYING YOU 
13 THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING THIS UP IN A POST-
14 CONVICTION MOTION, IF THERE IS SUCH A POST-JUDGMENT 
15 OR CONVICTION HERE. IF THERE IS SUCH A THING IN 
16 THIS CASE. SO I WILL PRESERVE THAT RIGHT ON BOTH OF 
17 THOSE COUNTS ON THE INFORMATION BEING ALLEGED UNDER 
18 A REPEALED STATUTE, AND ALSO ON THE SHONDELL ISSUE. 
19 SO THOSE ARE RESERVED TO YOU. THEY ARE DENIED 
20 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
21 MR. LJUNGBERG: I JUST WANT TO SAY, JUST 
22 ONE LAST THING, JUDGE, I DO NOT USE THE LEGAL 
23 DEFENDER CASE LOAD AS ANY KIND OF EXCUSE. AND YOU 
24 KNOW THAT ABOUT ME. I WOULD TRY TWO CASES A WEEK, 
25 AND I HAVE. AND I HAVE WON TWO CASES A WEEK. THE 
1 FIRST TWO FELONY TRIALS I DID WERE IN THIS 
2 COURTROOM, AND THEY WERE TUESDAY, WEDNESDAY, 
3 THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUDGE. AND I RESENT TO HELL 
4 THIS GUY SITTING OVER HERE WITH 1993 STATUTORY 
51 LANGUAGE, TELLING ME THAT BECAUSE I AM SO BUSY, I'M 
6 NOT DOING MY LEGAL RESEARCH. BECAUSE, DAMN IT, I 
7 AM. 
8 I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT I'M DOING, AND I DID IT 
9 EXACTLY FOR THIS REASON. 
10 THE COURT: OKAY. MR. LJUNGBERG, LET ME 
11 JUST CAUTION YOU TO BE A LITTLE MORE RESTRAINED. 
12 MR. LJUNBERG: I'M SORRY, JUDGE. 
13 THE COURT: LET ME SAY THIS. I AM NEVER 
14 DISSATISFIED, NOR HAVE BEEN HISTORICALLY WITH YOUR 
151 PERFORMANCE HERE IN TERMS OF PREPARATION. SO THERE 
16 ARE REASONS NOW THAT I DID NOT KNOW OF BEFORE THAT 
17 CREATED SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR YOU NOT TO FILE THAT 
18 MEMORANDUM. I HAVE SOME VIEWS OF THIS CASE WHICH I 
19 WON'T STATE NOW. I WILL DO THAT WHEN AN APPROPRIATE 
20 OPPORTUNITY COMES. 
21 BUT AT THIS POINT, THE MOTION FOR JOINDER 
22 OF COUNTS ONE AND TWO IS DENIED. THE MOTION FOR 
23 REDUCTION UNDER THE THEORY OF STATE VERSUS SHONDELL 
24 IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
25 THE MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE 
1 END OF THE STATE'S CASE IS TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
21 ALL RIGHT. AND THE COURT WILL DEAL WITH THAT AT THE 
3 CONCLUSION OF THE CASE. WHETHER IT'S AT THE 
41 CONCLUSION OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE JURY OR 
5 BEFORE OR AFTER THAT, I HAVEN'T DECIDED THAT. BUT I 
6 HAVE SOME SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME THINGS 
7 ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CASE. I'LL BE CANDID IN 
8 STATING THAT MUCH. 
91 MR. BAER: JUDGE, MAY I MAKE A COMMENT ON 
10 THE RECORD? NUMBER ONE, IT WAS NEVER THE 
11 INTENTION— IN FACT, I DON'T BELIEVE A WORD I 
12 ACTUALLY UTTERED MEANT TO DISPARAGE MR. LJUNGBERG. 
13 I THINK HE'S — FOR THE RECORD, HE'S AN EXCELLENT 
14 ATTORNEY. HE RAISES A NUMBER OF ISSUES — QUITE A 
15 NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT THAT WEREN'T NECESSARILY 
16 COMTEMPLATED. 
17 SO IT WAS NOT MEANT IN THAT WAY. AND I 
18 DON'T MEAN TO RAISE HIS RESENTMENT LEVEL TO THE 
19 LEVEL THAT HE SEEMS TO EXPRESS. SO THAT WAS 
20 CERTAINLY INADVERTENT. AND I HAVEN'T SAID ANYTHING 
21 ABOUT HIS CASE LOAD. I MYSELF HANDLE WELL OVER ONE 
22 HUNDRED OF THIS CASES A YEAR. SO IT'S NOT— 
23 THE COURT: I AM A FORMER ASSISTANT 
24 ATTORNEY GENERAL, SO YOU ARE NOT TALKING TO SOMEBODY 
25 WHO DOESN'T KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT IT. 
1 MR. BAER: PERHAPS I HAVE A LITTLE MORE 
2 DESCRETION AS TO HOW MUCH CASE LOAD I HAVE GIVEN TO 
3 ME, BUT IT'S FILED THROUGH OUR OFFICE. SO THAT'S 
4 NOT WHAT I MEANT. NOT TO DISPARAGE HIM. I WANT 
5 THAT TO BE VERY CLEAR. 
6 I WOULD HAVE — COULD HAVE DONE IT BEFORE. 
7 HIS POINTS ARE WELL-TAKEN, SOME OF THEM. I WASN'T 
8 DISPARAGING HIS PERFORMANCE OR HIS CHARACTER. 
9 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WE DON'T NEED TO 
10 ENGAGE IN MUCH MORE MUTUAL ADMIRATION HERE. THAT 
11 FLOWS ALL THE WAY AROUND. LET'S — HOW MUCH TIME DO 
12 YOU ANTICIPATE FOR YOUR ONE REMAINING WITNESS? 
13 MR. LJUNGBERG: JUDGE, IT'S GOING TO BE 
14 VERY BRIEF. TEN MINUTES MAXIMUM. FIVE OR TEN. 
15 THE COURT: WE'LL BRING THE JURY BACK IN. 
16 MR. LJUNGBERG: FOR THE RECORD, JUDGE, MS. 
17 GILES HAS ELECTED TO NOT TESTIFY. 
18 THE COURT: OKAY. 
19 MR. LJUNBERG: I HAVE SPOKEN WITH HER ABOUT 
20 HER RIGHTS IN THAT REGARD, AND SHE — 
21 THE COURT: THEN BEFORE WE DO THAT, 
22 MS. GILES, YOU DO RECOGNIZE THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT, 
23 IF YOU WICH TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND AND TO TELL 
24 YOUR STORY IN THIS CASE? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: YES, I DO. 
ADDENDUM D 
BY: MARK W. BAER #5440 
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DISTRICT COURT II SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KATHLEEN J. GILES 
02-22-66 
Defendant(s). 
The undersigned Robert Riddle on oath states on information 
and belief that the above-named defendant committed the crime of: 
COUNT I: WELFARE FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in violation 
of § 76-8-1201 et. seq., (formerly § 62A-9-130), Utah Code 
Annotated as follows:: That on, around or between July 1, 1993 and 
July 31, 1995, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant 
INFORMATION 
(summons issued) 
CASE NO. 
000001 
KATHLEEN J. GILES, as a party to the offense, knowingly, by false 
statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent 
means, failed to disclose any material fact or change in 
circumstances for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive 
public assistance to which she not entitled, or in an amount larger 
than that to which she was entitled and the value of benefits 
fraudulently obtained exceeded $5,000.00. 
COUNT II: WELFARE FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in violation 
of § 76-8-1201 et. seq. , (formerly § 62A-9-130) , Utah Code 
Annotated as follows:: That on, around or between August 1, 1993 
and February 28, 1994, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant KATHLEEN J. GILES, as a party to the offense, knowingly, 
by false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other 
fraudulent means, failed to disclose any material fact or change in 
circumstances for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive 
public assistance to which she not entitled, or in an amount larger 
than that to which she was entitled and the value of benefits 
fraudulently obtained exceeded $1,000.00. 
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PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT 
I, Robert Riddle, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
state as follows: I am an investigator with the Office of Recovery 
Services. I have reviewed Office of Family Support files, 
interviewed witnesses, and searched public records during the 
investigation of this case. My investigation has revealed the 
following information: 
1. Between the dates alleged in the information, the 
defendant applied for and received public assistance in the form of 
Aid to Families with Dependant Children, Medical Benefits and Food 
Stamps. 
2. At the beginning of the application procedure, recipients 
are notified that benefits are calculated based upon several 
factors including household composition status, marital status and 
all income attributable to the household unit, as well as assets 
owned by the defendant. Defendant was notified of her obligation 
to report any such circumstances or changes thereto, to the 
Department of Human Services' Office of Family Support. 
3 
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3. At various times throughout her receipt of assistance, she 
was given a written reminder of her obligation to report any such 
circumstances or changes thereto to said agency. 
4. During the period of allegation contained in the 
Information Count I, the defendant was married to William 
Felicetti; and/or was cohabitating with said Felicetti the father 
of the defendant's children; and did fail to so report said 
marriage and/or living conditions. 
5. During the period of allegation contained in the 
Information Count II, William Felicetti a member of the defendant's 
household, was employed and the defendant failed to report the 
employment and income of said Felicetti. 
8. As a result of the foregoing, between the dates alleged in 
the information Count I, the defendant received more than $5,000.00 
in Public Assistance which she would not have received but for her 
misrepresentations regarding household composition. 
8. As a result of the foregoing, between the dates alleged in 
the information Count II, the defendant received more than 
4 
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$1,000.00 in Public Assistance which she would not have received 
but for her misrepresentations regarding household composition. 
DATED this C, day of QjU&Uu'Jc', 1996. 
Robert Riddle 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this S day'of p y[u
 % , 1996 
1? \ 
judge ^*\_J*0BIN VV. hcco£ 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Robert Riddle, Office or Recovery Services 
Lead Investigator and Overpayment Specialist; Nick Floros; Julie 
Cook; Cathy Cordova, OFS Caseworker; Debbie Campbell, O.F.S. 
Caseworker; Edith Ludolph. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
Maik W. BAER ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM E 
ELEMENTS 
INSTRUCTION NO. > 
Before you can convict the defendant, KATHLEEN GILES, of the 
crime of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree felony, as charged in Count 
I of the Information, you must find that the State has proven each 
of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On, about or between July 1. 1993 and July 31, 1995, the 
defendant, KATHLEEN GILES, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
2. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly received 
unauthorized public assistance benefits, by failing to disclose to 
the Department of Human Services each fact that may materially 
affect the determination of her eligibility to receive public 
assistance; to wit, marital status; 
3. And such failure to disclose resulted in an overpayment; 
^\ And the value of the payments, assistance, or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed is or exceeds 
$5,000.00. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish eajgh of 
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If you find that the evidence has 
established each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
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ELEMENTS 
INSTRUCTION NO. V* 
Before you can convict the defendant, KATHLEEN GILES, of the 
crime of Welfare Fraud, a Third Degree felony, as charged in Count 
II of the Information, you must find that the State has proven each 
of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. On, about or between August 1, 1993 and February 28, 1994. 
the defendant, KATHLEEN GILES, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
2. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly received 
unauthorized public assistance benefits, by failing to disclose to 
the Department of Human Services each fact that may materially 
affect the determination of her eligibility to receive public 
assistance; to wit, household composition and income; 
3. And such failure to disclose resulted in an overpayment; 
And the value of the payments, assistance, or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed is or exceeds 
$1,000.00. 
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish egjeh^of 
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. If you find that the evidence has 
established each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant guilty. 
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